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Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does
the One Who Has the Gold Really
Make the Rules?
by
THOMAS R. ANDREWS*

Several years ago, Steven Brill reported in the American Lawyer that
"Wall Street's Sullivan & Cromwell and Shearson Lehman/American
Express have begun secret negotiations aimed at a deal in which S & C
would become the first law firm to be acquired by a financial services
conglomerate." 1 As the article went on to make clear, the report was a
"complete fiction. There [was] no such deal in the works."'2 Indeed,
Brill remarked that "the idea in its totality is off the wall for many reasons."' 3 Nevertheless, he noted that "step by step, the elements of the
[merger] scenario and the principles underlying them all make sensewhich is a vivid commentary of sorts about where we are and where
we're going in the legal business." 4 More recently, Mr. Brill composed
variations on the same theme when he suggested, for a variety of reasons,
that it might make good economic sense for some of the large law firms,
such as Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, or Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, to go public, as have some prominent members of the New
5
York Stock Exchange.
Mr. Brill is not alone in finding the idea of broader ownership of law
firms attractive. Not long ago, Paula Dwyer reported in Business Week
that "soon anybody may be able to own a law firm." 6 Dwyer commented
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. B.A. 1969,
University of Pittsburgh; M.A. 1973, Northwestern University; J.D. 1979, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Rob Aronson and Bill Andersen on
earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Brill, War of the Tombstones, AM. LAW., Mar. 1985, at 1.
2. Id. at 14.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Brill, Psst-WannaBuy a Hot Stock?, AM. LAW., Nov. 1987, at 3.
6. Dwyer, Soon Anybody May Be Able to Own a Law Firm, Bus. WK., Jan. 26, 1987, at
42 (emphasis omitted).
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that developments in two bar associations "could pave the way for such
retailers as Sears, Roebuck & Co. to add legal counseling to their array of
services."' 7 She quoted Stephen Gillers, of New York University, as predicting that " '[e]ventually the distribution of legal services will be no
different from any other product.'
These stories make good copy. But are they really any more than
wishful thinking by business entrepreneurs? 9 For at least sixty years
nonlawyers have been prohibited from offering their nonlegal talents in a
business combination with lawyers practicing law.' 0 Moreover, when the
ABA's new model rules were adopted in 1983, the ABA considered carefully but rejected a proposal that would have lifted the traditional ban on
nonlawyer ownership of a law business." Nonetheless, the point of each
article was that the relevant restrictions in the ethical rules are on their
way out.
Commentators have given considerable attention to the unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers, 12 and to the offering of legal services
by nonprofit institutions. 1 3 The focus of this Article differs: it is the
practice of law by lawyersfor profit in a business partially owned or controlled by nonlawyers.14 The difference is important. For even if it is
"8

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. In fairness to Brill and Dwyer, each was careful to point out that lawyers' ethical
rules pose an obstacle to the kind of development predicted. Brill noted that the merger envisioned was "dependent on S & C successfully moving to overturn current Code of Professional
Responsibility rules prohibiting nonlawyers from sharing in lawyers' fees .... " Brill, supra
note 1, at 1. In his more recent suggestion that law firms should consider going public, he
concedes that the idea assumes that the current prohibitions in the lawyer ethical codes could
be "erased." Brill, supra note 5, at 3. Dwyer's article focused on the attempts in North Dakota and the District of Columbia to eliminate the rules prohibiting nonlawyers from owning
law firms. Dwyer, supra note 6, at 42.
10. See infra section I.
11. See infra section I(B)(3).
12. See, e.g., UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE DECISIONS (G. Brand ed. 1937); UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK (J. Fischer & D. Lachmann eds. 1972); C. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS 824-49 (1986); Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good
Fences Really Make Good Neighbors-orEven Good Sense?. 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159;
Rhode, Policing the ProfessionalMonopoly: A Constitutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis of Unauthorized PracticeProhibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981).
13. See, e.g., B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 233-50
(1970).
14. The subject of this Article has received new interest recently as a result of the ABA's
consideration and rejection of reform in this area. See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS,

PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT:

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION MODEL

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 176-78 (1981) [hereinafter PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT].
Recently, Professors Hazard, Hodes, and Wolfram have discussed the ABA's rejection of reform. 1 G. HAZARD, JR. & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 468-77 (1987) [hereinafter HAZARD & HODES];
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agreed that lawyers should be licensed, and that those who cannot meet
the licensing requirements should be prohibited from practicing law, it
does not follow intuitively or necessarily that nonlawyers should be prohibited from offering their nonlegal resources and talents in a business
combination with lawyers practicing law.
In section I the Article discusses the content and history of rules
prohibiting the combination of nonlawyers with lawyers in a partnership.
Section II then examines the arguments that traditionally have been advanced in support of these prohibitions. The section concludes that the
prohibitions cannot be justified as necessary for protection of legal services because less restrictive alternatives are available. Indeed, the existing rules seem to owe their surprising tenacity more to the fact that
they serve the profession's economic self-interest than to any public purpose. In section III the Article argues that the prohibitions are no longer
justified, if they ever were. Moreover, the section shows that there is a
need and demand for innovative arrangements between lawyers and
nonlawyers that would provide multidisciplinary services to the public,
and that would provide infusions of capital to serve the public better and
more efficiently. The existing prohibitions, however, inhibit such arrangements. Finally, section IV examines alternative approaches to reform at the state and federal level.

A.

I. Historical Background
Unauthorized Practice by Nonlaw Corporations Offering the Services of
Lawyers

(1) UnauthorizedPractice in the States
Prohibitions against nonlawyers practicing law have been common
in this country for at least a hundred years. 15 The New York provisions
are representative of those adopted around the turn of the century. 16 At
least as early as 1899, the New York Penal Code prohibited anyone from
C, WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 879; see also Gilbert & Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner:
Moderate ProposalsDeserve a Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETics 383 (1988) (allowing nonlawyers to participate in law firms could improve legal services); Note, Legalizing Nonlawyer Proprietorshipin the Legal Clinic Industry: Reform in the Public Interest,9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 625
(1981) (authored by Gerhardt M. Nielsen) (proposing alternatives to the blanket suppression
of lay ownership in the legal field).
15. Christensen, supra note 12, at 159-201. In a comprehensive study of the unauthorized practice of law movement published in 1980, Barlow Christensen found that 5 states had
unauthorized practice legislation purporting to go back to the mid-1800s, and another 17
states had legislation dating from the period 1870 to 1920. Id. at 180 & nn. 113, 114 & 117.
16. See UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 3-110 (collecting and
excerpting unauthorized practice legislation).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

practicing as an attorney or making it a business to practice as such
"without having first been duly and regularly licensed and admitted to
practice law in the courts of record of this state." 17 In 1909, the Penal
Code was amended further to prohibit corporations and voluntary associations from practicing law or furnishing attorneys, legal advice, or
"legal services of any kind in actions or proceedings of any nature or in
8
any other way or manner."'
The most significant feature of the unauthorized practice legislation,
for our purposes, is that it not only prohibited the unauthorized practice
of law by nonlawyers, but it also prohibited nonlawyers from combining
with lawyers to offer the lawyer's services for profit. As we shall see, the
significance of this legislation cannot be fully understood until the parallel restrictions on lawyers are considered. Nevertheless, the unauthorized practice legislation has served as a deterrent against nonlawyer
business organizations that have attempted, in one way or another, to
market the services of attorneys to the public.
Although enforcement of such restrictions over the years has been
only sporadic, the message sent by the occasional court decisions is nonetheless clear.19 Perhaps the most influential opinion was In re Co-operative Law Co.,2 0 an early New York case. The petitioner was a business
corporation organized for profit to provide legal services to its subscribers by the employment of "a staff of competent attorneys and counsellors
at law." 2 1 The court concluded that the corporation was illegal even
under the law as it existed prior to the amendment of the 1909 New York
statute, which explicitly prohibited corporations from offering such serv17.
N.Y. PENAL CODE § 270, reprintedin 4 THE CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 2709-10 (1909) (indicating that § 270 derived from Laws 1898, ch. 165, § 4, as
amended by Laws 1899, ch. 225, § 2) (current version at N.Y. JUD. LAW § 478 (McKinney
Supp. 1987)). The New York Penal Code also made it a misdemeanor for any attorney
"knowingly [to] permit any person, not being his general law partner or a clerk in his office, to
sue out any process or to prosecute or defend any action in his name." N.Y. PENAL CODE
§ 277 (1909) (current version at N.Y. JUD. LAW § 492 (McKinney 1983)). But notwithstanding such provisions in New York, or elsewhere, the unauthorized practice statutes were aimed
primarily at nonlawyers. It remained for the professional associations to regulate the conduct
of the lawyers themselves.
18. See N.Y. PENAL CODE § 280 (1925) (indicating provision added by Laws 1909, ch.
483) (current version at N.Y. JUD. LAW § 495 (McKinney 1983)).
19. It might be more accurate to describe enforcement as "episodic" since bar enthusiasm
for enforcing the unauthorized practice laws seems to have waxed and waned. See Christensen, supra note 12, at 175-201. But even though the general enthusiasm for unauthorized
practice enforcement may have peaked sometime in the 1950s or 1960s, there continue to be
just enough unauthorized practice business cases to suggest that the laws on the books still
carry a significant enforcement threat.
20. 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).
21. Id. at 481, 92 N.E. at 15.
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ices. The court gave four principal grounds for this conclusion: (1) corporations cannot become members of the bar and they should not be able
to do indirectly what they cannot do directly; (2) an attorney employed
by a corporation would be responsible to the corporation rather than to
the client of the corporation; (3) the corporation might be controlled
wholly by nonlawyers and organized simply to make money; (4) the pub22
lic would have no remedy to protect itself from the corporation.
Co-operative Law has been widely influential since 1910 both in result and reasoning. 23 Its conclusion that corporations owned or controlled in part by nonlawyers may not offer the services of lawyers to the
public has been followed, in one form or another, in practically every
American jurisdiction. 24
Occasionally, as in Co-operative Law, the business enjoined has been
established for the sole purpose of providing legal services to the public.25
More frequently, however, the provision of lawyers' services by enterprises owned or controlled by nonlawyers has been incidental to another
business carried on by the enterprise. 26 Thus, banks have been enjoined
repeatedly from selling the services of their in-house attorneys to customers to prepare wills, trusts, or real estate documents; to handle foreclo22. Id. at 483-84, 92 N.E. at 16.
23. See, e.g., State Bar Ass'n of Conn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
235-36, 140 A.2d 863, 870-71 (1958); Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. United Mineworkers, 35 Ill. 2d
112, 120-21, 219 N.E.2d 503, 508 (1966); In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 614 &
n.1, 194 N.E. 313, 317 & n.1 (1935); In re Educ. Law Center, 86 N.J. 124, 134, 429 A.2d 1051,
1056 (1981); Carter v. Berberian, 434 A.2d 255, 256 (R.I. 1981); State ex rel. Lundin v.
Merchants Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 17, 177 P. 694, 696 (1919).
24. See 62 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 769, 779 (1937) (Report of Standing Committee on
Unauthorized Practice of the Law) ("Probably nothing is better settled than that a corporation
cannot render legal services for or practice law in respect of the affairs of another although it
may do so by employing a lawyer.").
25. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Consolidated Business & Legal Forms, Inc., 386 So. 2d 797,
801 (Fla. 1980) (for-profit corporation set up to provide legal services to the public through full
time lawyer employees); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Gold Shield, Inc., 52 Ohio Misc. 105,
112, 369 N.E.2d 1232, 1237 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1975) (for-profit corporation designed to
provide legal services at a discount in return for an annual "membership" fee and 10% of the
legal fees paid to participating lawyers by members).
26. Occasionally courts have allowed nonlawyers to provide legal advice or services (i.e.,
to practice law) on the theory that the services are incidental to the nonlawyer's primary business. See, e.g., Creekmore v. Izard, 367 S.W.2d 419 (Ark. 1963) (filling in standard forms by
realtor); Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713
(1955) (same); Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N.J. Eq. 599, 53 A.2d 800 (1947) (advice on labor
relations), aff'd, 142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863 (1948); Bar Ass'n of Tenn. v. Union Planters
Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326 S.W.2d 767 (1959) (drafting documents incidental to
title business). The "incidental theory," however, has never been accepted widely. See-cases
collected in UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 132-38.
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The

provision of a lawyer's services by collection agencies to creditor customers also has been found to be an unauthorized practice of law by the

collection agency. 28 Moreover, the same result has been reached for
nonlaw businesses providing lawyers to handle workers compensation
claims, 29

32
patent applications, 30 bond issues, 3 1 landlord claims, mort-

gage processing, 33 title opinions, 34 business incorporation, 35 condemnation proceedings, 36 tax audits, 37 heir claims, 38 and real estate tax
assessment proceedings.

39

(2) The Role of Bar Associations in the Policing of Unauthorized Practice

Not surprisingly, the bar associations played an active role in promoting restrictions against the offering of lawyers' services by nonlawyers. One of the first initiatives in this direction was taken by the New
York County Lawyers' Association as early as 1914, when it established

a committee to combat the unauthorized practice of law. 4° By 1940, approximately 400 state and local bar associations had similar committees. 41 Some of these committees issued advisory opinions on what
would constitute the unauthorized practice of law, and occasionally these
27. See, e.g., State Bar Ass'n of Conn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
140 A.2d 863 (1958); People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901
(1931); Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377 (1939).
28. E.g., J. H. Marshall & Assocs., Inc. v. Burleson, 313 A.2d 587 (D.C. 1974); Kentucky
Bar Ass'n v. Tiller, 641 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1982); State ex rel. State Bar of Wis. v. Bonded
Collections, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d 643, 154 N.W.2d 250 (1967). See generally Annotation, Operations of Collection Agency as UnauthorizedPractice ofLaw, 27 A.L.R.3d 1152, 1157-61 (1969).
In some jurisdictions, however, collection agencies have been permitted to hire and direct attorneys for the collection of accounts by taking an assignment of the customers claim and thus
becoming, at least ostensibly, the "real party in interest." See, e.g., Washington State Bar
Ass'n v. Merchants Rating & Adjusting Co., 183 Wash. 611, 49 P.2d 26 (1935).
29. People v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728 (1937).
30. People ex rel. Lefkowitz v. Lawrence Peska Assocs., Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 59, 393
N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Marshall v. New Inventor's Club, 117 N.E.2d 737 (Ohio
C.P. 1953).
31. Wayne v. Murphy-Favre & Co., 56 Idaho 788, 59 P.2d 721 (1936).
32. Unger v. Landlords' Management Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 68, 168 A. 229 (1933).
33. In re L.R., 7 N.J. 390, 81 A.2d 725 (1951).
34. Steer v. Land Title Guar. & Trust Co., 113 N.E.2d 763 (Ohio C.P. 1953).
35. In re Pace, 170 A.D. 818, 156 N.Y.S. 641 (App. Div. 1915).
36. In re Bensel, 68 Misc. 70, 124 N.Y.S. 726 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910).
37. Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943). But see infra section
III(D)(1), for a discussion of the accounting profession.
38. In re Tuthill, 256 A.D. 539, 10 N.Y.S.2d 643 (App. Div. 1939).
39. Stack v. P.G. Garage, Inc., 7 N.J. 118, 80 A.2d 545 (1951); People ex reL Trojan
Realty Co. v. Purdy, 174 A.D. 702, 162 N.Y.S. 56 (App. Div. 1916).
40. Christensen, supra note 12, at 189.
41. Id.
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opinions were quite influential nationally. 42 State bar associations also
appeared as the plaintiff in court actions seeking to enjoin the unauthor4 3
ized practice of law.
In addition to the activities of state and local bar associations, for
many years the ABA was one of the primary moving forces behind attempts to outlaw and police the unauthorized practice of law. 4 4 From
1930 until 1984 the Association maintained a Standing Committee on
Unauthorized Practice of Law, which published a periodical entitled the
UnauthorizedPracticeNews and occasionally issued opinions. 45 One of
the ABA Committee's informative opinions, for example, was promulgated after the passage of ERISA in an attempt to clarify the proper role
of nonlawyer professionals in the pension plan area. One of the practices
of nonlawyers that was singled out for attention was the provision of
legal services through lawyer employees of a nonlaw business. The
ABA's position was unequivocal:
Nonlawyers should not hold themselves out as lawyers or as substitutes for lawyers by stating or suggesting .. that they will perform
any necessary legal services, such as: legal drafting, representing clients before courts or government agencies, or interpreting statutes,
regulations, or rulings. Because lawyer-employees of companies offering
such plans may perform legal services only on behalf of the employer
and not on behalf of the employer's clients or customers, the Committee
believes that references in4promotional
materialsto legal experts or legal
6
expertise are misleading.
42. In 1975, for example, the Unlawful Practice of Law Committee of the New York
State Bar issued an advisory opinion that it was improper for lay persons to provide advice or
services of a legal nature in connection with the design and drafting of employee benefit plans.
Unlawful Practice Comm., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Advisory Op. 28 (1975), reprintedin 47 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 707 (1975). This opinion became the focus of national hearings held by the ABA and
was ultimately influential in shaping the ABA's position on the matter. ABA Standing Comm.
on Unauthorized Practice of Law, Employee Benefit Planning Informative Opinion A, at 2-3
(1977) [hereinafter Informative Opinion A], reprintedin Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 159, at R-16
(Oct. 17, 1977).
43. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 27-28.
44. See generally C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 825-27 (The ABA engaged in an "explicit campaign ...

to encourage state and local bar associations to form their own unauthor-

ized practice committees."); Christensen, supra note 12, at 189-90 (The Special Committee on
the Unauthorized Practice of Law created in 1930 was "a catalyst and unifying force in the
campaign against unauthorized practice."); Rhode, supra note 12, at 8-11 (history of ABA
enforcement techniques).
45. See Rhode, supra note 12, at 8. The Committee was set up in 1930, 55 REPORTS OF
THE A.B.A. 94 (1930) (proceedings of 53d Annual Meeting, 5th Session), and disbanded in
1984. ABA/BNA, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 381 (1984) [hereinafter
LAWYERS' MANUAL].

46. Informative Opinion A, supra note 42, at R-16 (emphasis added).
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Thus, through its Unauthorized Practice Committee, the ABA actively
has sought to prevent nonlawyers from participating in the business of
47
law, even when the practice of law itself is to be done only by lawyers.
B.

Restrictions on Lawyer Collaboration with Nonlawyers in the Lawyer
Ethics Codes

(1) The ABA Canons of Ethics
The prohibitions on lawyers allowing nonlawyer financial or managerial involvement in the business of law first appeared in the ethics
codes around 1928. In that year, the ABA added Canons 33 through 45
to the Canons of Ethics. 48 Canon 33, which dealt generally with partnerships, provided, in part:
In the formation of partnerships for the practice of law, no person
should be admitted who is not a member of the legal profession, duly
authorized to practice, and amenable to professional discipline. No
person should be held out as a practitioner or member who is not so
admitted ....
Partnerships between lawyers and members of other
professions or non-professional persons should not be formed or permitted 4where
a part of the partnership business consists of the practice
9
of law.

Two other canons adopted in 1928 contained corollary provisions. Canon 34 provided that "[n]o division of fees for legal services is proper,
except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility." 50 Canon 35 provided that "[t]he professional services of a lawyer
should not be controlled or exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer ....
He should avoid
47. Between 1937 and 1978, the ABA also negotiated interprofessional "Statements of
Principles" with other professions, including accountants, architects, banks, claims adjusters,
collection agencies, insurers, engineers, publishers, title companies, realtors, and social workers. A compilation of these statements may be found in VII MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW
DIRECTORY 71M-90M (110th ed. 1978). They attempted to chart out the appropriate sphere
of activity for each profession vis-A-vis the legal profession, and to ensure that nonlawyers did
not tread on the practice of law. Many have been rescinded, apparently as a result of concern
that they may violate the antitrust laws. 105 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 291, 382, 637, 789
(1979); see also United States v. New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,371 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (consent decree enjoining bar association from adopting statements
of principles delineating practice of nonlawyer corporate fiduciaries); Podgers, Statements of
Principles: Are They on the Way Out? 66 A.B.A. J. 129, 129 (1980) (commenting on rescission
by the State Bar of California Board of Governors of approximately 20 statements of
principles.
48. 53 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 119-30 (1928) (proceedings of the 51st Annual Meeting).
49. Id. at 778.
50. Id. (emphasis added).

March 1989]

NONLAWYERS IN THE BUSINESS OF LAW

all relations which direct the performance of his duties in the interest of
'5
such intermediary." '
The precise origin of these interrelated provisions is unclear 5 2 It is
clear, however, that they expressed the combined wisdom of legislature,
bench, and bar. In 1926, the ABA Special Committee on Supplementing
the Canons of Professional Ethics published and circulated an annotated
version of the Canons compiling materials from various sources that shed
light on the Canons that were adopted two years later. 53 In an introductory section, the Special Committee noted that the Canons did not define
the practice of law, and then went on to quote extensively from a 1920
report issued by a committee of the Conference of Delegates of Bar Associations (Delegates Report).5 4 The material quoted from the Delegates
Report included several paragraphs condemning professional associations between lawyers and nonlawyers. 55 The Delegates Report, itself,
collected thirty-six pages of excerpts from court decisions and statutes on
the unauthorized practice of law, including the New York statutes discussed above. 56 Finally, the Annotated Canons contained a number of
opinions of the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 5 7 and a digest of numerous ethics opinions of the Committee on
58
Professional Ethics of the New York Cotnty Lawyers' Association.
51. Id. at 779 (emphasis added).
52. The first sentence quoted from Canon 33, and the sentences quoted from Canons 34
and 35 were adopted as proposed by the ABA committee appointed to propose supplements to
the existing canons. 52 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 379 (1927) (Report of the Special Committee
on Supplementing the Canons of Professional Ethics). Evidently the additional language in
Canon 33 was added after the Committee's 1927 report, but there is no additional indication in
the official reports as to when or why this addition was made.
53. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SUPPLEMENTING THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, ANNOTATED CANONS 10 (1926) [hereinafter ANNOTATED CANONS].
54. Id. at 8-15.
55. Id. at 10-Il (quoting Report of the Special Committee of the Conference of Bar Association Delegates to Prepare a Brief for the Use of State and Local Bar Associations (1920)
[hereinafter Delegates Report] (emphasis added)). The material quoted from the Delegates
Report is discussed in detail infra section II.
56. Delegates Report, supra note 55, at 12-48; see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying
text.

57. ANNOTATED CANONS, supra note 53, at 85-94. One of the ABA Opinions, Formal
Op. 8 (1925), reprinted in 50 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 518, 520-21 (1925), concluded that a
"lay agency is not entitled to practice law ... indirectly, by employing licensed attorneys to
carry on that portion of its activities for it" because the lay person would thus be exploiting the
lawyer, sharing the lawyer's professional responsibility, and sharing the lawyer's fees. ANNOTATED CANONS, supra note 53, at 91-94. The Opinion relied on the In re Co-operativeLaw
and Merchants Protective Corp. cases, among others.
58. ANNOTATED CANONS supra note 53, at 94-112; 50 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 85-112
(1925); e.g., Opinions of the Comm. on Professional Ethics of the N.Y. County Lawyers'
Ass'n, Op. 201 (1922) (concluding that it was professionally improper for a lawyer to form a
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Clearly all of these materials were influential in the drafting of the busi59
ness canons.
Although the new business canons seem to have expressed a consensus of legislature, bench, and bar, they were not without their opponents.
The drafting committee noted that "there is substantial difference of view
in the profession respecting its recommendations as to partnerships, division of fees, intermediaries, and the bonding of lawyers. 60 One member
of the Committee filed a Minority Report, in which he expressed the
opinion that "aside from professional policy, I think that there is nothing
inherently 'unethical' in the formation of partnerships between lawyers
engaged in certain kinds of work and an expert engineer, student of finance, or some other form of expert."' 6 1 But this member ended up voting for the prohibition of such partnerships "[a]s a matter of professional
policy."' 62 No other explanation of the grounds for or against the provi-

sions are to be found in the official reports.
Regardless of this "substantial difference of view," the language
adopted in 1928 to restrict lawyer business associations with nonlawyers
remained remarkably unchanged in the years that followed. 63 During
partnership with a certified public accountant for the practice of public accounting and tax
report service), reprinted in 3 OPINIONS: COMMITTEES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1980)

[hereinafter STATE OPINIONS].
59. The ABA Special Committee noted in its 1927 Report that information and recommendations were sought from each bar association, but that "[tihe results of this effort were
disappointing, as little information was received from these sources, outside of New York City.
The two leading bar associations in New York City, however, reprint and circulate the answers
of their committees to inquiries for advice, and these were readily accessible." 52 REPORTS OF
THE A.B.A. 374 (1927). Among the most influential figures were Charles Boston and Henry
Jessup, both of New York. Boston chaired the Special Committee on Supplementing the Canons and compiled the Annotated Canons that was circulated in 1926. ANNOTATED CANONS,
supra note 53, at iv, 4. Jessup was a member of the New York County Lawyers' Association
Ethics Committee from 1908 until 1924, a member of the Special Committee on Supplementing the Canons, and also had been chairman of the ABA Committee on Legal Ethics and
Grievances. Id. at iv; H. JESSUP, THE PROFESSIONAL IDEALS OF THE LAWYER: A STUDY OF
LEGAL ETHICS xxvi (1925). In 1925, Jessup published a work on legal ethics in which he
opined that ethical difficulties arise
when those desiring so to associate themselves [in a partnership to practice law] are
not all members of the same Bar, or are not all members of any Bar .... The reason

lies not only in the inherent nature of the profession, but also in that of a partnership,
which assumes sharing of liabilities, work, and profits. The lawyer must not share
his professional compensation with laymen.
Id. at 20. Jessup cited as authority and reproduced ethics opinion 201 of the New York
County Bar Ethics Committee, which is quoted above. Id. at 20, 198. Jessup reproduced all of
the New York County Bar's ethics opinions in his book. Id. at 104-212.
60. 52 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 378 (1927).
61. Id. at 388 (Minority Report of F. W. Grinnel).
62.

Id.

63.

In 1937, Canon 47 was adopted, which broadly prohibited a lawyer from permitting
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the forty years that the Canons were in force, they were interpreted consistently by the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances
to prohibit nearly any form of business association between lawyers and
nonlawyers that offered legal services to the public. The most important
of these ABA opinions struggled with the problem of lawyers who were
employed by or in partnership with nonlawyers, such as patent agents or
accountants, who were entitled to practice law to a limited extent under
federal law, regardless of their lack of state bar membership. 64 For example, in Formal Opinion 297 issued in 1961, the Committee addressed
the situation in which a lawyer is employed by an accounting firm:
When a lawyer-employee advises his lay employer in regard to a matter pertaining to the affairs of a client of the employer and the giving of
such advice by the lawyer-employee directly to the client would involve him in the practice of law, the lawyer is proceeding in violation
of Canon 35' '65when he operates through his employer as an
intermediary.
Only if the lawyer completely disassociates himself from the practice of
law and refrains from holding himself out as a lawyer could he partici66
pate in a business enterprise with such nonlawyers.
The Committee also made clear during this time period that there
was nothing in the business restrictions that was unique to the partner"his professional services, or his name, to be used in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay agency, personal or corporate." 62 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A.
353, 767 (1937).
64. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 297 (1961) (accountant), reprinted
in ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS WITH THE CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS ANNOTATED AND CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS ANNOTATED 652,

654 (1967) [hereinafter ABA OPINIONS]; see also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 269 (1945) (certified public accountant), reprintedin ABA OPINIONS,
supra, at 598; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 257 (1944)
(patent agent), reprintedin ABA OPINIONS, supra, at 567; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Formal Op. 239 (1942) (certified public accountant), reprintedin ABA OPINIONS, supra, at 536-37; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 225
(1941) (collection agency), reprintedin ABA OPINIONS, supra, at 516; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 201 (1940) (patent application representative), reprintedin ABA OPINIONS, supra, at 484; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
Formal Op. 35 (1931) (collection agency), reprinted in ABA OPINIONS, supra, at 278; ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 32 (1931) (patent application prosecutor), reprintedin ABA OPINIONS, supra, at 276; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 31 (1931) (attorney may not accept employment from a corporation
to prepare articles, by-laws, and papers for exchange of stock), reprinted in ABA OPINIONS,
supra, at 275.
65. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 297 (1961), reprinted in ABA
OPINIONS, supra note 64, at 652-54.
66. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 269 (1945), reprinted in ABA OPINIONS, supra note 64, at 598; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 239 (1942), reprintedin ABA OPINIONS, supra note 64, at 536-37.
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ship form of law practice. In Formal Opinion 303, the Committee recognized that professional law corporations had federal income tax benefits,
and approved of them under certain conditions. 67 Among the conditions
were restrictions on nonlawyer involvement analogous to the ban on law
partnerships with nonlawyers. 68 In justifying these restrictions, the
Committee explained that "the substance of an arrangement is controlling, not the form." 69
(2) The ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
a. The 1969 Model Code

In 1969, the Canons were replaced by a new Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code). 70 Within five years of the ABA's
adoption of the Model Code, practically every state in the union had
adopted it either officially or unofficially. 7' Although the format and the
content of the old Canons changed dramatically in the new Model Code,
the content of the restrictions on lawyer-nonlawyer business associations
did not. The last sentence of Canon 33 became Disciplinary Rule (DR)
3-103(A): "A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if
'72
any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law."
Canon 34, prohibiting fee-splitting, became DR 3-102(A): "A lawyer or
law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer .. . . 73 Canon 47
67.

ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 303 (1961), reprinted in ABA
supra note 64, at 661.
68. Id. For the precise form of these restrictions, see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(C) (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. See infra note 72.
OPINIONS,

69.

ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 303 (1961), reprinted in ABA
supra note 64, at 662. The Committee continued:
Canon 33 prohibits the formation of a partnership . . .between lawyers and nonlawyers. This prohibition would likewise apply to the practice of law in any other
form. Permanent beneficial and voting rights in the organization set up to practice
law, whatever its form, must be restricted to lawyers while the organization is engaged in the practice of law.

OPINIONS,

Id.
70. 94 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 389-92, 729 (1969).
71. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 56-57.
72. MODEL CODE, supra note 68, DR 3-103(A). One new addition to the Model Code
was the extension of the ban on partnerships with nonlawyers to legal practice by a professional corporation. DR 5-107(C) prohibited a lawyer from practicing
with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice
law for a profit, if:
(1) A non-lawyer owns any interest therein ...
(2) A non-lawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) A non-lawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of
a lawyer.
Id. DR 5-107(C).
73. Id. DR 3-102(A).
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became DR 3-101(A): "A lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law." 74
Canon 35, prohibiting'lawyers from allowing a nonlawyer to control
or exploit the lawyer's services, did not survive in the new Model Code as
a distinct rule, but its message is reiterated in several different contexts.
DR 5-107(C) prohibits a professional corporation in which a nonlawyer
has the right to direct or control a lawyer's professional judgment. 75 In
addition, DR 5-107(B) prohibits a person who recommends, employs, or
pays a lawyer to render legal service for another "to direct or regulate his
professional judgment. ' 76 Finally, Ethical Consideration (EC) 3-3
makes clear that the Disciplinary Rules prohibit a lawyer "from submit77
ting to the control of others in the exercise of his judgment."
An important addition in the Model Code was the attempt to provide some justification for the bans on nonlawyer involvement in the
business of law. Because nonlawyers were not subject to "the requirements and regulations imposed upon members of the legal profession" 78
the bans were considered necessary to assure the public of integrity, competence, loyalty, and confidentiality in the delivery of legal services. 79
During the deliberations on the Model Code, there seems to have
been no significant debate as to the propriety of continuing the business
prohibitions contained in the prior Canons. One indicator of the ABA's
mood is found in the debate over a new and related provision dealing
with lawyer involvement with nonprofit organizations that "recommend[ ], furnish[ ] or pay[ ] for legal services."'80 In a series of landmark
decisions in the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court had established the
right of such lay organizations to provide legal services to members and
beneficiaries. 81 Although the ABA understood the need to recognize
these decisions, the proposed rule did so only grudgingly. DR 2-103(D)
permitted involvement with such organizations "only in those instances
and to the extent that controlling constitutional interpretation at the time
of the rendition of the services requires the allowance of such legal service activities."' 82 When the proposed DR 2-103(D) was being consid74. Id. DR 3-101(A).
75. Id. DR 5-107(C).
76. Id.
77. Id. EC 3-3.
78. Id. EC 3-1.
79. Id. EC 3-1 to 3-3.
80. Id. DR 2-103(D)(4).
81. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
82. 94 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 390 (1969).

590
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ered by the ABA House of Delegates, a substitute was proposed that
would have (1) allowed profit-making institutions to furnish legal services to members or beneficiaries provided the organization did not derive
any profit from the legal services; (2) allowed such an organization even if
its sole purpose was the furnishing of legal services; and (3) specified certain safeguards to protect the clients of a lawyer dealing with such an
organization . 3 The substitute was opposed, however, by the Chairman
of the ABA Section of General Practice, who claimed to have surveyed
more than 9,000 members on the subject. He objected that if the substitute were adopted,
the laymen will run the practice, and not the lawyers. All the evils
that you can imagine will result from allowing laymen to run the law
practice and not the lawyers: loss of the independence of the Bar, loss
of the traditional client-lawyer relationship, the encroachment of advertising, solicitation and the84morals of the marketplace, a reduction in
the quality of legal services.

Another member echoed these remarks by warning that the substitute
amendment "would permit any lawyer employed by the lay agency who
has given advice to a layman in the performance of the lawyer's duties
for that group, then to accept employment and fees from that layman." 8 5
Not surprisingly, the substitute amendment was rejected. 86 Clearly this
was not the occasion for a full and open debate on the propriety of restrictions on nonlawyer involvement in law practice for profit.
Nonetheless, in 1975 the Model Code was amended to permit profitmaking entities to furnish legal services to members or beneficiaries pro87
vided that the entity does not derive any profit from the legal services.
83.

Id. at 390-91; see also Sutton, The American Bar Association Code of Professional

Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEx. L. REV. 255, 307-10 (1970) (summarizing the substance of and significant differences between the two proposals).
84. 94 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 391 (1969)(remarks by William J.Fuchs of Philadelphia). In what may be one of the more remarkable exchanges in this whole debate, a Mr.
Chesterfield Smith of Lakeland, Florida, is said to have "pooh-poohed Mr. Fuchs's objections": - 'Wehave let people spread what they call in Florida heifer dust over the issue that
shouldn't have heifer dust spread over it.' " Id.
85. Id. at 392 (remarks by Henry Pitts of Chicago); see also Pitts, Group Legal Services:
A Plan to Huckster ProfessionalServices, 55 A.B.A. J.633, 633 (1969) (charging that the same

proposals were "a design for the destruction of an independent Bar,... contrary to fundamental and essential canons of a true profession .... totally unrealistic and inadequate, and ... an

invitation to uncontrollable exploitation of lawyers by lay agencies-to the detriment of the
public we are committed to serve.").
86. 94 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 392 (1969).
87. MODEL CODE, supra note 68, DR 2-103(D)(4)(A). The new rule permitted a lawyer
to assist a nonlawyer organization that was to furnish her legal services to others provided that
no profit is derived by it from the rendition of legal services by lawyers, and that, if
the organization is organized for profit, the legal services are not rendered by lawyers
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This amendment was substantially the same as that rejected in 1969.88
Apparently at the request of the President of the ABA, no opposition to
this recommended change was voiced, and it passed without meaningful
debate. 89 According to the drafting committee, however, the prohibition
on the derivation of profit by the lay organization was based on a concern
that otherwise the lay organization might interfere with the exercise of
the lawyer's professional judgment. 90
b. Ethics Committee Interpretive Opinions

The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has
infrequently addressed the prohibitions on lawyer partnerships with
nonlawyers since the adoption of the Model Code. In Informal Opinion
1241, the Committee again was asked whether a lawyer properly could
form a partnership with a nonlawyer licensed to practice before the Internal Revenue Service if the activities of the partnership were limited to
those permitted pursuant to Treasury Department Circular 230.91 The
Committee concluded that "[t]he practice by a lawyer of representing
others before the Internal Revenue Service is the practice of law ....If a
lawyer were to form a partnership with an enrolled agent when such
employed, directed, supervised or selected by it except in connection with matters
where such organization bears ultimate liability of its member or beneficiary.
Id.
88. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 912-14.
89. The Reports of the ABA indicate that President Fellers requested that no amendments
be offered to the Committee's Recommendation from the floor. 100 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A.
247 (1975) (House of Delegates Proceedings, 2d Session, Midyear Meeting).
90, Ad Hoc Study Group, American Bar Association, Section and Committee Reports to
the House of Delegates,Report No. 110, app. A at 5 (Feb. 24-25, 1975), reprintedin AMERICAN
BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 76 (1979). In
explaining this provision, the Ad Hoc Committee stated:
This provision is premised upon the connection between the realization of profit by a
lay organization from the rendition of legal services by a lawyer and the potential for
interference with the independent exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment to
enhance that profit. It is so drafted, however, as to embrace profit-making organizations where the lawyers rendering the services are free of such control by the organization as might result in interference with the independent exercise of professional
judgment. Thus profit-making organizations providing legal services to members or
beneficiaries could not do so through lawyers employed by them but they could recommend lawyers provided they did not direct or supervise them ....This provision
is not intended to bar service under employers' plans for employees; it simply induces
such plans to be effected through nonprofit-organizations.
Id.
91. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1241 (1973),
reprinted in 2 ABA COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFOR-

MAL ETHICS OPINIONS 495 (1975) [hereinafter INFORMAL ETHICS]. On the federal authoriza-

tion of nonlawyers to practice before the I.R.S., see 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.3, 10.4 (1987).
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work by the lawyer was involved, DR 3-103 would be violated."'92 The
Committee acknowledged that its prior opinions
suggest that if the lawyer does not hold himself out as a lawyer or
maintain a law office, he properly (at least in theory) may form a partnership with an enrolled agent for the purpose of practicing before the
Internal Revenue Service, provided that the activities of the partnership are limited to those which do not constitute the practice of law.
However, as a practical matter, it is difficult if not impossible for the
Committee to visualize such a situation, and if any part of its activities
could be construed to
constitute the practice of law, such a partnership
93
would be improper.
A complete understanding of the import of this opinion is only possible if one understands what would constitute the "practice of law."
Neither the Canons nor the Model Code attempted to define "practice of
law." '94 But the ABA Ethics Committee has taken the position that a
lawyer is "practicing law" whether she is engaged in law practice per se,
or in another "law-related" occupation, "[i]f the ...occupation is so lawrelated that the work of the lawyer in such occupation will involve, inseparably, the practice of law."' 95 Among the occupations that the Committee considered to be so "law-related" as to involve "inseparably" the
practice of law if carried on by a lawyer were those of "marriage counselor, accountant, labor relations consultant, real estate broker, or mort'96
gage broker."
When this breathtaking view of what constitutes the "practice of
law" by a lawyer is read together with Informal Opinion 1241 and Formal Opinion 303, one can only conclude that according to the ABA
Committee, a lawyer may not form any kind of for-profit business organization in which a nonlawyer has a financial or managerial role if the
92.

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1241 (1973),

reprintedin 2 INFORMAL ETHICS, supra note 91, at 495.

93. Id.
94. The Model Code did offer this much:
Functionally, the practice of law relates to the rendition of services for others that
call for the professional judgment of a lawyer. The essence of the professional judgment of the lawyer is his educated ability to relate the general body and philosophy
of law to a specific legal problem of a client ....
MODEL CODE, supra note 68, EC 3-5.
95. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (1972), reprinted in ABA COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL AND
INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 62, 65 (1985) [hereinafter FORMAL AND INFORMAL OPINIONS].
96. Id.; see also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 775 (1965) (lawyer
engaged in real estate business), reprintedin INFORMAL ETHICS, supra note 91, at 366, 369;
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 297 (1961) (lawyer engaged in accounting
practice), reprinted in ABA OPINIONS, supra note 64, at 652, 654-55.
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business of the organization is law or law-related. 9 7 As discussed later,
this is a surprising conclusion that is very difficult for the ABA to Teconcile with existing practice by lawyers. 98 Nevertheless, this seems to be
the logical consequence of the ABA's opinions.
(3) The ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct
In 1983 the ABA's ethics code underwent yet another major revision with the adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules). 99 The 1983 Model Rules have been adopted, with
amendments, in at least thirty states.l°° Once again, the changes to the
ethics codes did not extend to the prohibitions on nonlawyer involvement
in the business of law. 0 1 These 1983 rules, however, unlike their predecessors, were the subject of critical reexamination by the drafting committee and of public debate within the ABA House of Delegates.
Before proposing a new set of ethical rules, the ABA Commission
on Evaluation of Professional Standards, known as the "Kutak Commission," 10 2 spent five years reviewing and reformulating the prior Model
Code of Professional Responsibility.10 3 The subject of nonlawyer involvement in the business of law prompted one of the most radical of the
Commission's proposals. As proposed by the Commission, Rule 5.4
would have provided that:
97.

But see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1445

(1980) (involving a business organization-with two lawyers and one nonlawyer as the shareholders-that provided sophisticated economic and economic-related analysis to lawyers, and
suggesting that the enterprise did not violate Canon 3 of the Code because the "final responsibility and supervisory powers remain with the attorney who hires this corporation"), reprinted
in FORMAL AND INFORMAL OPINIONS, supra note 95, at 353, 354.
98. See infra section III(D).
99. A.B.A. CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE A.B.A.

HOUSE OF DELEGATES ii (1987) [hereinafter ABA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; 108 REPORTS OF
THE A.B.A. 778 (1983) (House of Delegates Proceedings).
100. 1 LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 45, § 01:3-01:4 (Supp. Dec. 21, 1988).
101. DR 3-103(A), prohibiting law partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers, was readopted verbatim as Model Rule 5.4(b). MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
5.4(b) (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. Similarly, the analogue for professional corporations, DR 5-107(C), was re-adopted as Model Rule 5.4(d). MODEL RULES, supra, Rule 5.4(d).
DR 3-102(A), prohibiting fee-splitting with a nonlawyer, became Model Rule 5.4(a). MODEL
RULES, supra, Rule 5.4(a). Finally, DR 3-101(A), enjoining a lawyer from aiding the unauthorized practice of law, became Model Rule 5.5(b), different in form but not in content: "A
lawyer shall not ... assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of
activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law." MODEL RULES, supra, Rule 5.5(b).
102. During most of the Commission's existence, it was chaired by Robert J.Kutak, hence
the popular name. Mr. Kutak, however, died in 1983 and was replaced as Chairman by Robert W. Meserve. ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3-5 (1984).

103.

Id.
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A lawyer may be employed by an organization in which a financial
interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer, or
by a lawyer acting in a capacity other than that of representing clients,
such as a business corporation, insurance company, legal services organization or government agency, but only if.
(a) There is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship;
(b) Information relating to representation of a client is protected as
required by Rule 1.6;
(c) The organization does not engage in advertising or personal contact with prospective clients if a lawyer employed by the organization
would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 7.2 or Rule 7.3; and
(d) The arrangement does not result in charging a fee that violates
Rule 1.5.104
The Commission's justification for this proposed change was spelled
out in the commentary that accompanied the proposed rule, and in the
"Legal Background" section circulated with drafts of its proposals. The
comment pointed out that "[g]iven the complex variety of modern legal
services," all of which "raise problems concerning the client-lawyer relationship ... it is impractical to define organizational forms that uniquely
can guarantee compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct."10 5
The "Legal Background" section was much more critical of the traditional rules:
To prohibit all intermediary arrangements is to assume that the lawyer's professional judgment is impeded by the fact of being employed
by a lay organization ....
The assumed equivalence between employment and interference with the lawyer's professional judgment is at
best tenuous ....
Applications of unauthorized practice principles,
only tenuously related to substantial ethical concerns raised by intermediary relationships, may be viewed as economic protectionism for
traditional legal service organizations ....
The exceptions to per se prohibitions on legal service arrangements
involving nonlawyers have substantially eroded the general rule, leading to inconsistent treatment of various methods of organization on the
basis of form or sponsorship. Adherence to the traditional prohibi104. 107 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 886-87 (1982) (Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards).
105. Id. Among the variety of legal services organizations that the Commission noted
were:
multimember partnerships, firms employing paraprofessionals and professionals of
other disciplines, professional corporations, insurance companies that employ counsel who represent insureds, law departments of organizations, and group legal service
organizations in which nonlawyers, or lawyers acting in a managerial capacity, may
be directors or have managerial responsibility. Many modern law firms employ
nonlawyers to exercise broad managerial authority in the operation of the firm.
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tions has
impeded development of new methods of providing legal
10 6

services.
Nonetheless, when proposed Rule 5.4 came before the House of Delegates for consideration, it was opposed vociferously on several grounds:
(1) the Commission proposal would permit Sears, Montgomery Ward, H
& R Block, or the Big Eight accounting firms, to open law offices in
competition with traditional law firms;10 7 (2) nonlawyer ownership of
10 8
law firms would interfere with the lawyer's professional independence;
(3) nonlawyer ownership would destroy the lawyer's ability to be a "professional" regardless of the economic cost;10 9 and (4) the proposed
change would have a fundamental but unknown effect on the legal pro106. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFr, supra note 14, at 176-78 (citations omitted).
107. See, eg., Unedited Transcript of ABA House of Delegates Session 28, 37, 45-48 (Feb.
8, 1983) (remarks by Al Conant, Bob Hawkins, and James Bierbower) [hereinafter HOD Transcript] (on file at The Hastings Law Journal). Al Conant, for example, remarked: "You each
have a constituency. How will you explain to the sole practitioner who finds himself in competition with Sears why you voted for this?, How will you explain to the man in the mid-size firm
who is being put out of business by the big eight law [sic] firms? How will you explain that?"
Id. at 48.
The HOD Transcript from which quotations are made in this Article is necessarily unofficial since the ABA has not released an official transcript to the public.
108. See id. at 33, 36, 38, 41, 44, 46-47 (remarks by Frank Rosiny, Al Conant, Charles
Kettlewell, Tony Palermo, and Bob Hawkins). Mr. Hawkins, for example, stated:
I cannot conceive that a lawyer can maintain his independence and his independent
judgment over a period of time when he's on a salary from a corporation that's looking over his shoulder at his results in terms of profit. Now if you wish to destroy our
profession as we've known it... if you want to destroy it, the young lawyer's opportunities in this country to enjoy the same professional independence that you and I
have known, then... support the Commission.
Id. at 4647. Mr. Conant suggested the proposal was a breach of the golden rule: "The one
who has the gold makes the rules, and the one [who] has the gold under existing 5.4, is going to
be a non-lawyer." Id. at 38.
109. Mr. Kettlewell asked:
Is it cost-effect[ive] to provide full representation? Is it cost-effective to zealously
represent your client? Is it cost-effective to spend enough time with your client to get
the job properly done? I think the answer is no. But clearly as lawyers, as professionals, we must get the job done properly, and we must spend that time and we must
do those things. But what about the business venturer who owns this firm, he who
hires or fires the lawyers? They needn't view it that way. Now if the safeguards of
the Commission were adequate, . . . fine. But [they] won't be, and I submit who is in
trouble if there is a violation of these rules? Is it the venturer or the lawyer? It's the
lawyer; the venturer isn't even under the jurisdiction.
Id. at 4142. Mr. Rosiny declared that
the rule as proposed by the Commission is very unwise policy because if nothing else,
it is demeaning to the profession, and this would wound the profession in a way, I
submit, very similar to that which is occurring every day by virtue of lawyer advertising, but with a difference ... [t]his Rule 5.4 ... will be a self-inflicted wound.
Id. at 36.
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fession.I 0 These arguments carried the day, and an amendment offered
by the ABA Section on General Practice, which basically substituted the
prior Model Code provisions for the Commission proposal, was
adopted.' 11
(4) Implementation of the Lawyer Ethics Codes in the States

The ABA, because it is only a professional association, has abso112
lutely no authority over the practice of law anywhere in the country.
That authority, instead, is exercised primarily by the state court systems,
and to a lesser extent by the state legislatures, and by the three branches
of the federal government. Nonetheless, relevant portions of the ABA
ethics codes have been copied or heavily relied upon by state courts and
legislatures, and thus given the force of law. The process began with the
ABA Canons. These were adopted formally as court rules in at least four
states, and by legislation in three more. 113 In many other states, however, the Canons were viewed by the courts as guidelines that "lawyers
could ignore only at their peril."' "1 4 The 1969 ABA Model Code was
implemented even more widely. Within five years of the ABA's adoption
of the Model Code, practically every state in the union had adopted it
110. Al Conant stated:
I cannot tell you what those effects are, but I don't believe anyone can .... It also
authorizes anyone else in the business world to get into the law business. Now is that
good or bad? I don't know. Will it result in cheaper services to the consumer? I
don't know, but nobody can tell you that it will. Will it result in better services to the
consumer? I don't know. I doubt it, but no one can tell you that it will. Will it
destroy the economic existence of individual lawyers? I don't know, but nobody can
tell you that it won't. Will it affect the lawyer's independence of judgment? I don't
know, but nobody can assure that it won't .... No one can tell you what the impact
of 5.4 is going to be on the legal profession, but everyone can assure you, and you can
assure yourself merely by reading it, that it is going to have a major impact and mark
a fundamental change in the practice of law.
Id. at 37-38.
1ll.
Id. at 49. For summaries of the debates, see ABA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
99, at 159-64; 51 U.S.L.W. 2493 (1983).
112. Occasionally, it seems, the ABA overestimates its role in the rulemaking process. In
Formal Opinion 325, for example, the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
purported to "hold" that "in jurisdictions where the Code of Professional Responsibility is in
effect a retirement plan may ethically be adopted by either a professional corporation or a law
firm . . .even though contributions to it are based upon profit sharing." ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 325 (1985), reprinted in FORMAL AND
INFORMAL OPINIONS, supra note 95, at 58. Clearly the ABA has no authority to "hold"
anything of the kind for jurisdictions which, in the exercise of their sovereign power, have
chosen to adopt the ABA Model Code.
113. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 55-56.
114. Id. at 55.
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either officially or unofficially. 115 Finally, the 1983 Model Rules apparently have been adopted already, with amendments, in at least thirty
states. 116 Although the new rules have been amended substantially
before adoption by many states, none of these amendments extend to the
restrictions on nonlawyer involvement in the business of law. 117 Thus,
the ABA rules governing the association of lawyers and nonlawyers effectively have been made the governing law, either directly or indirectly,
in most states.118
The state lawyer ethics codes provide the basis for the discipline of
lawyers. While lawyers are not disciplined frequently for impermissibly

practicing law with nonlawyers, the few reported cases make clear that
the state business canons are enforced when they come before the
courts. 119 In one particularly influential decision, a lawyer who was vicepresident of a bank foreclosed mortgages, conducted probate proceedings, and provided other legal services, including giving legal advice, to
the bank and the bank's customers. 120 All his legal fees were turned over
to the bank as bank income. 12 1 The court held that this constituted unlawful practice of law by the bank and was misconduct by the lawyer.
115. Id. at 56-57.
116. 1LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 45, § 01:3-01:4 (Supp. Dec. 21, 1988). Two other
states have reviewed their ethical codes since 1983 and have decided to retain the prior code
with some amendments. Id.
117. See id. § 01:11-01:30 (summarizing differences between state versions and ABA
Model). As proposed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the rules would have contained
the Kutak Commission's proposed Rule 5.4 rather than the version that was ultimately borrowed by the House of Delegates from the 1969 Code. But the North Dakota Court rejected
the proposal and opted for the ABA Model Version from the old Code. 3 LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 45, at 202. The form of the rules proposed by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals also would approximate the Kutak Commission proposed Rule 5.4, except that it
would not allow a business organization owned by both lawyers and nonlawyers to do anything except practice law and nonlawyers would be required to perform professional services
for the firm. ProposedRules of ProfessionalConduct and Related Comments, D.C. BAR REP.
43-45 (Special Supp. Aug./Sept. 1988) [hereinafter D.C. Proposed Rule] (on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
118. Along with the ABA Model Rules, the ABA's ethics opinions interpreting those rules
also have been very influential with the state courts. See, eg., Crawford v. State Bar of Cal., 54
Cal. 2d 659, 665-67, 355 P.2d 490, 493-94, 7 Cal. Rptr. 746, 749-50 (1960); In re Rothman, 12
NJ. 528, 550-56, 97 A.2d 621, 633-36 (1953).
119. In re Cornelius, 520 P.2d 76, 79 (Alaska 1974); Florida Bar v. Goodrich, 212 So. 2d
764, 765 (Fla. 1968); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Martin, 308 Md. 272, 281 518 A.2d
1050, 1054 (1987); In re DeVinny, 255 N.W.2d 832, 833 (Minn. 1977); In re Otterness, 181
Minn. 254, 255, 232 N.W. 318, 319 (1930); In re Mann, No. 15542, slip op. (Nev. Mar. 30,
1984) (LEXIS, States library, Nev file); Rothman, 12 N.J. at 535, 97 A.2d at 625; In re L.R., 7
N.J. 390, 392, 81 A.2d 725, 726 (1951); In re Droker, 59 Wash. 2d 707, 719-20, 370 P.2d 242,
248 (1962).
120. Otterness, 181 Minn. at 255, 232 N.W. at 319.
121. Id.
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The lawyer was only censured severely, however, since he had a good
record otherwise, no complaints had been made by clients, and he had
severed his ties with the bank.122
In addition to such court decisions, state bar association ethics committees have played a continuing advisory role by issuing ethics opinions
on what forms of business enterprises are permissible for lawyers. While
these opinions have no legal authority, they often are looked to for guidance by courts, 123 and certainly by lawyers seeking to avoid disciplinary
proceedings. Here again the ABA ethics opinions have been quite influ124
ential with local bar committees, sometimes being adopted verbatim,
and sometimes simply being followed by the local committee. 125 Only
rarely has a local bar association disagreed with the ABA ethics
opinions. 126
As with the ABA ethics opinions, state and local bar ethics opinions
repeatedly have made it clear in a variety of contexts that lawyers ethically may not form partnerships or other businesses with nonlavyers if
any part of the business would involve the practice of law. Business associations between lawyers and accountants, in which the lawyer is to
give tax or legal advice have been condemned regularly in local ethics
opinions. 127 Relationships with collection agencies in which the collection agency acts as an intermediary with or partner of an attorney who
128
prosecutes collection suits have been another source of disapproval.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Crawford v. State Bar of Cal., 54 Cal. 2d 659, 664-67, 355 P.2d 490, 493-94,
7 Cal. Rptr. 746, 748-50 (1960); Rothman, 12 N.J. at 553-56, 97 A.2d at 635-36; Gardner v.
North Carolina State Bar, 316 N.C. 285, 293-94, 341 S.E.2d 517, 522 (1986).
124. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 22 (1962), reprintedin 3 STATE OPINIONS, supra
note 58 (adopting ABA Formal Opinions 297 & 305 verbatim); Wis. State Bar, Ethics Op. E65-2, reprintedin WIs. STATE BAR BULL. 45 (Supp. June 1979) (adopting ABA Formal Opinion 297 verbatim).
125. See e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 557 (1984), reprinted in 4 STATE OPINIONS, supra
note 58.
126. See e.g., Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 84-2 (1984), reprintedin
LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 45, § 801:4608.
127. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 557 (1984), reprintedin 4 STATE OPINIONS, supra
note 58; see also Iowa State Bar, Ethics Op. 80-38 (1980), noted in LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra
note 45, § 801:3602; Md. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 77-37 (1976) ("[N]o attorney may hold
himself out to the public as a member of a firm performing legal services unless all members of
the firm are also members of the Bar.") (on file at The Hastings Law Journal); N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n, Op. (1967) (violation of Canon 35 for a lawyer who owns a tax service corporation to
provide legal advice through the corporation to customers of its services), reprinted in 3 STATE
OPINIONS, supra note 58; N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, Ops. 427 (1954), 201 (1922) (impermissible for a lawyer to form a partnership with CPA for practice of public accounting and tax
report service), reprinted in 3 STATE OPINIONS, supra note 58; Wis. State Bar, Ethics Op. E65-2, reprinted in Wis. BAR BULL. 45 (Supp. June 1979).
128. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 423 (1975), reprinted in 4 STATE OPINIONS, supra
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In other ethics opinions, lawyers have been advised not to draft wills for
bank clients as employees of the bank; 129 not to accept employment from
a nonlawyer consulting firm that proposed to provide their counseling
and legal representation to clients who have been discharged wrongfully; 130 not to set up a partnership with a nonlawyer to provide consulting services for small businesses in the area of affirmative action, contract
negotiations, and other matters relating to the employer-employee relationship;13 ' not to form a partnership, or a joint venture, or a professional corporation, or a business corporation with nonlawyers that
proposes to "provide total legal and financial services";1 32 not to prepare
estate planning and life insurance proposals for customers of an insurance agency that is the lawyer's client; 133 and not to form a partnership
134
with nonlawyer counselors to provide divorce mediation services.
C. Summary
The foregoing survey shows that the legal restrictions on nonlawyer
involvement in the business of law remain firmly in place in practically
every jurisdiction in the country. Indeed, despite two major revisions in
the lawyer ethics codes, and major changes in the nature of law practice
note 57; see also Ill. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Ops. 322(a), (b) (1969), 244 (1964), 181 (1959), 111
(1955), reprintedin ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASS'N, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 5, 43,

79, 125-26 (1980) [hereinafter ILLINOIS OPINIONS]; N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 465
(1977), reprinted in 4 STATE OPINIONS, supra note 57; N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, Ethics
Ops. 98 (1916), 47 (1914), reprinted in 3 STATE OPINIONS, supra note 58; Wis. State Bar,
Ethics Ops. E-61-1, E-65-3, E-72-2, reprinted in WIs. BAR BULL. 41-43, 46, 51 (Supp. June

1979).
129. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 261 (1965), reprinted in ILLINOIS OPINIONS, supra note 128,
at 88.
130. Md. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 86-45 (1986).
131. Mo. Bar Advisory Comm., Informal Op. 3 (1981), reprinted in Mo. BAR BULL. 3
(Dec. 1981); see also Md. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 82-14 (1981) (attorney should not become partners with or employees of nonlawyer "scientific professionals" selling advice to businessmen on the prevailing medical, scientific, and legal standards for employment) (on file at
The Hastings Law Journal);Wis. State Bar, Ethics Mem. Op. 4/67 (lawyer should not form
partnership with a nonlawyer to engage in labor-management relations work), reprinted in
Wis. BAR BULL. 75 (Supp. June 1979).
132. Professional Ethics Comm'n of the Bd. of Overseers of the Me. Bar, Advisory Op. 79
(1987) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal);see also Wis. State Bar, Ethics Op. E-84-21,
reprinted in 2 NAT'L REP. ON LEGAL ETHICS Wis: Opinions 10 (1985).
133. II. State Bar, Ethics Op. 474 (1975), reprintedin ILLINOIS OPINIONS, supra note 128,
at 188; see also Ill. State Bar, Ethics Op. 167 (1958), reprintedin ILLINOIS OPINIONS, supra
note 128, at 33.
134. Or. State Bar, Ethics Op. 488 (1983) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal);see also
Conn. Bar, Formal Op. 35 (1982), reprintedin 56 CONN. BAR J. 498 (1982); N.Y. City Bar,
Ethics Op. 1987-1 (1987), reprinted in 2 STATE OPINIONS, supra note 58; Nassau County
(N.Y.) Bar, Ethics Op. 84-1 (1984), reprinted in 5 STATE OPINIONS, supra note 58.
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over the last sixty years, those restrictions have shown themselves stubbornly resistant to change. Through a combination of statutes and judicial decision, nonlawyers are prohibited not only from practicing law
directly, but also from forming partnerships or corporations that offer
the services of lawyers to the public. Moreover, through ethical rules
and interpretive opinions by courts and bar associations, lawyers similarly are prohibited from combining with or working for nonlawyers to
offer the lawyers' services to the public. The Article now examines why
these restrictions have remained such a stable feature of our legal landscape, and whether they can withstand scrutiny.
II.

Critical Review of the Justifications Given
for the Business Canons

The longstanding ban on the combination of lawyers with nonlawyers in a partnership that offers legal services has been justified by several
arguments. One set of arguments posits a fundamental incompatibility
between lawyers and nonlawyers. Chief among these is the argument
that nonlawyers, if allowed to engage in the business of law, will be
driven predominantly by a desire to make money, thus threatening the
quality of legal services and the lawyers' ethical obligations. Another
argument based on the notion of incompatibility is that nonlawyers are
not subject to the rules of professional responsibility adopted in each jurisdiction. As such, the nonlawyers are not subject to discipline by the
state courts, as are lawyers. A second set of arguments alleges that nonlawyer involvement in the business of law would cause lawyers to violate
their ethical duties relating to independence, advertising, solicitation, and
confidentiality. Finally, the rules are justified on grounds of economic
protectionism. This section examines each of these justifications and
concludes that they do not support the prohibition and that the current
restrictions in the ethical rules should be modified.
A. A Fundamental Incompatibility Between Lawyers and Nonlawyers
The entrenched prohibitions on nonlawyer involvement in the business of law sometimes are defended on the ground that there is a fundamental incompatibility between lawyers and nonlawyers.
(1) The Nonlawyer as a Legal Fiction

Perhaps the most spurious of these arguments is directed at the
practice of law by a corporation, as if that were attended by special evils.
The argument holds that a corporation cannot by its nature practice law
since "[i]t is not a natural person, [and] possesses neither learning, good
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character, nor capacity to take an oath, or to preserve and occupy a personally confidential relation with a client."' 135 This facile argument was
made in the 1920 Delegates Report upon which the ABA relied when it
136
first adopted the business canons.
While it is true that corporations cannot practice law in the sense
that natural persons can, this is because corporations cannot do anything
except through human beings serving as their agents. The important
question is what we should allow corporations to do through their
human agents. Now that lawyers are widely permitted to practice law as
shareholders or employees of professional corporations, it should be obvious that there is nothing inherent in the nature of the corporation as a
business form that precludes its shareholders and employees from practicing law. It is the step from the lawyer-owned and managed professional corporation to the traditional business corporation that occasions
the difficulty. Should there be a rule against a corporation financed or
managed in part by nonlawyers offering the services of lawyers to the
public? The argument based on the fictional nature of the corporate person does not even suggest an answer to that question.
(2) The Nonlawyer Cares Only About Profits
A more common argument against allowing nonlawyer involvement
in the business of law is that laymen, unlike lawyers, may be driven solely
by a desire to make money. Sometimes this argument is aimed at practice in the corporate form only. For example, in Co-operative Law the
court argued that if a lawyer were allowed to practice law on behalf of a
corporation, "[h]is master would not be the client but the corporation,
conducted it may be wholly by laymen, organized simply to make money
....
There would be ... no guide except the sordid purpose to earn
money for stockholders." 1 37 At other times, the argument is directed
generally at nonlawyers. As stated in the 1920 Report to the Delegates
of Bar Associations, "[t]he sole inducement to the layman to practice law
and do law business is the fee derived therefrom .... 138 Interestingly,
similar arguments were made by members of the ABA House of Delegates in 1983 when the House was debating the Kutak Commission's
proposed Rule 5.4. One delegate argued that a nonlawyer business yen135. ANNOTATED CANONS, supra note 53, at 10.
136. The New York Court of Appeals also may have been guilty of the same argument in
Co-operative Law. See In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483-84, 92 N.E. 15, 16
(1910). Certainly the Massachusetts Supreme Court made the argument in In re Opinion of
the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 613-15, 194 N.E. 313, 317 (1935).
137. 198 N.Y. at 483-84, 92 N.E. at 16.
138.

ANNOTATED CANONS, supra note 53, at 11.
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turer in the business of law would ask only if the service were "cost39
effective," not what it would require to perform a job properly.
There are several problems with this argument. First, it presupposes
that the profit motive is bound to lead to inadequate or unethical legal
services. No empirical support is offered for this assumption. Indeed, a
great many lawyers have found that quality legal services do pay, and
pay very well. Moreover, it is puzzling that this thesis is maintained in a
society in which the profit motive otherwise is thought to lead to the
production of goods and services for which there is consumer demand. I40
If the argument has any truth, it must serve as an indictment of our
whole economy, or at least of the service economy.
Secondly, there is no reason to suppose that corporations or laymen
engage in the "sordid" business of making money any more than do
traditional law firms. Few lawyers would be in private practice if they
did not anticipate being able to make money, whether for themselves,
lawyer partners, lawyer shareholders, or lawyer associates. The argument implies that nonlawyer corporations may be organized "simply to
make money," whereas law firms will not be. But there is nothing inherent in the nature of the law business to preclude lawyers from devoting
themselves entirely to making money, any more than there is anything
inherent in the nature of a nonlaw corporation that precludes the principals from recognizing other purposes than making money.
Finally, the argument based on incompatibility suffers from an oversimplistic, even arrogant, view of nonlawyers. Nonlawyers enter into
other occupations and professions every day with inducements other
than making money. There is no reason to suppose that the set of motivations will be any different if nonlawyers are permitted to enter into the
law business. Indeed, one would suppose that nonlawyers employed by
lawyers in the business of law, such as paralegals, economists, and lobbyists, would illustrate the truth of the point. This is not to deny that some
nonlawyers will enter the business of law solely to make money; but the
same can be said of many lawyers entering the business.
Even assuming that the public needs to be protected against professionals whose sole motivation is money, society already has devised various statutory and common-law rules to do just that. 14' As the next
139.

HOD Transcript, supra note 107, at 41-42.

140.

See, e.g., A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH

OF NATIONS bk. I., § 7 (1776); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 178-79 (4th ed. 1987).
141. The antitrust laws, for example, generally forbid monopolistic behavior and agreements in restraint of trade, 15 U.S.C §§ 1, 2 (1987); the consumer protections laws forbid
unfair and deceptive practices, id. § 45(a)(1); and the law of agency imposes duties of loyalty to
clients, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387-98 (1958).

March 1989]

M8ONLAWYERS IN THE BUSINESS OF LAW

603

section explains, there is no reason to suppose that these rules cannot be
applied successfully to nonlawyers engaged in the business of law.
(3) Nonlawyers Are Not Subject to Regulation by the Courts
The fact that nonlawyers are not subject to the rules of professional
responsibility that regulate members of the bar is another argument offered in support of a ban on the business association of lawyers and
nonlawyers. For example, the court in Co-operative Law argued that
with the nonlawyer "[t]here would be no remedy by attachment or disbarment to protect the public from imposition or fraud, no stimulus to
good conduct from the traditions of an ancient and honorable profession
.....

142

The problem of remedies is also a principal reason given for the

prohibitions in the lawyer codes. Canon 33 of the ABA Canons counseled against forming partnerships with those not "amenable to professional discipline."' 143 Ethical Consideration 3-1 of the 1969 Model Code
of Professional Responsibility argued that "the public can better be assured of the requisite responsibility and competence if the practice of law
is confined to those who are subject to the requirements and regulations
imposed upon members of the legal profession."144 Not surprisingly, this
argument also was made against the Kutak Commission's proposed Rule
1 45
5.4 by a member of the House of Delegates.
It does not follow from the lack of bar regulation, however, that
there would be no remedies against nonlawyers who are engaged in the
business of law. 146 Nonlawyers, like lawyers, are subject to civil liability
for breach of fiduciary duties and breach of duties of care owed to clients.
Under the Second Restatement of Torts, for example, "one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required
to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of
142. In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483-84, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910). Sometimes
this argument, as well, has been aimed particularly at the practice of law by a corporation:
"One engaged in the practice of law is subject to personal discipline for misconduct and to
penalties for violating the duties of the profession that could not possibly attach to a corporate
body." State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 17, 177 P. 694, 696
(1919).
143. 53 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 778 (1928) (Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics).
144. 94 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 756 (1969) (Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards); MODEL CODE, supra note 68, EC 3-1; see also id. ECs 3-3, 3-4 (discussing the public
interest served by regulating the legal profession).
145. "[Who is in trouble if there is a violation of these rules? ... It's the lawyer; the
[nonlawyer] isn't even under the jurisdiction." HOD Transcript, supra note 107, at 41-42
(remarks by Charles Kettlewell).
146. See generally Rhode, supra note 12, at 94-95 (nonlawyers still subject to civil liability
stemming from common law, administrative regulation, or statute).
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that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities."' 147
Many jurisdictions have held that nonlawyers engaged in the unauthor48
ized practice of law are subject to the same duty of care as lawyers. 1
Similarly, many of the ethical duties imposed by the various codes of
professional responsibility parallel duties that exist under the law of
crimes, torts, contracts, property, agency, or evidence.' 49 Some nonlawyer professionals have comparable duties imposed on them under their
own professional codes of conduct.' SO Remedies under consumer protection statutes also would be available both to public enforcement agencies
and private individuals.15t In addition, some legal remedies, such as
those available under the antitrust laws, might be more readily available
against nonlawyers engaged in the business of law than against lawyers. 152 In sum, while it might be true that there would be no remedy of
disbarment against nonlawyers, it simply is not true that if nonlaw corporations could practice law that "[t]here would be no remedy ... to pro153
tect the public from imposition or fraud."'
Moreover, it is important to note that the propriety of permitting
nonlawyers personally to perform legal services that they presently are
not permitted to perform is not at issue here. Nonlawyers would remain
subject to the unauthorized practice rules, which carry criminal penalties
in many jurisdictions. Rather, we are exploring the propriety of allowing
nonlawyers to combine with lawyers to offer the lawyers' services to the
public. Those lawyers will continue to be subject not only to the same
civil duties to which the nonlawyers would be subject, but also to the
lawyer disciplinary rules. If those disciplinary rules are enforced against
the lawyers working with the nonlawyers, the nonlawyers would need to
respect the lawyers' ethical duties or they would find themselves without
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
148. See, e.g., Bowers v. Transamerica Title Insur. Co., 100 Wash. 2d 581, 587, 675 P.2d
193, 198 (1983); R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 79 (2d ed. 1981).
149. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 49.
150. See CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (R. Gorlin ed. 1986) (reproducing
professional ethics codes for health, education, government, and business professionals, as well
as those for lawyers).
151. See, e.g., Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wash. 2d 52, 66, 691 P.2d 163, 171 (1984) (The
"entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law" are subject to the Washington Consumer Protection Act.).
152. Lawyer conduct that is authorized by state courts or codes of professional responsibility adopted by courts or legislatures, for example, generally would be exempt from antitrust
liability under the state action exemption. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 579-80 (1984);
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 359-62 (1977). The same would not be true for
nonlawyers who were not subject to extensive regulation by court rule. See infra text accompanying notes 229-31.
153. In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483-84, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910).
147.
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lawyer partners or employees. 154 It would be to the lawyers' advantage,
as well as to the nonlawyers', to ensure that the nonlawyers did not step
over that line of unauthorized practice.
B. Likelihood that Lay Involvement Would Cause Lawyers to Violate Their
Ethical Duties
Another set of arguments questions whether lawyers could comply
with their ethical duties if nonlawyers were permitted to acquire financial
or managerial interests in the business of law.
(1) Nonlawyers Would Interfere with Lawyers' ProfessionalJudgment
One frequently made argument is that financial or managerial involvement would give the nonlawyer control over the lawyer and necessarily lead to interference with the lawyer's professional judgment, This
rationale was used in Co-operative Law in the context of a corporation
offering the services of lawyers. The court argued that "[t]he relation of
attorney and client.., cannot exist between an attorney employed by a
corporation to practice law for it, and a client of the corporation" because "[tihe corporation would control the litigation, the money earned
would belong to the corporation, and the attorney would be responsible
to the corporation only." 155 The concern for the lawyer's independence
also was given as one of the reasons for the business canons in Ethical
Consideration 3-3 of the 1969 Code.1 56 Similarly, when the House of
Delegates was considering the proposed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, one delegate stated, "I cannot conceive that a lawyer can maintain his independence and his independent judgment over a period of
time when he's on a salary from a corporation that's looking over his
shoulder at his results in terms of profit."' 157 Another delegate quipped
that the proposed abolition of the prohibitions would be a "breach of the
154. Note, supra note 14, at 657.
155. Co-operative Law, 198 N.Y. at 483-84, 92 N.E. at 16. The short response to this
argument is that it need not be so. While it may well be true that the money earned for the
services provided would belong to the corporation, as claimed, it simply does not follow that
the corporation would "control" the representation, or that the attorney necessarily would be
responsible only to the corporation. Certainly there is nothing inherent in the corporate form
that would require this. Indeed, if there were, it is difficult to see how lawyers employed by
law partnerships or corporations could maintain their professional responsibilities to their clients. The money they earn belongs to their employer organization, but they are expected to
remain responsible to their client just the same.
156. EC 3-3 stated, in relevant part, that the rules "prohibit a lawyer ...from acting in
cases of divided loyalties, and from submitting to the control of others in the exercise of his
judgment." 94 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 756 (1969) (Committee on Evaluation of Professional
Standards).
157. HOD Transcript, supra note 107, at 46-47 (remarks by Bob Hawkins).
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golden rule. The one who has the gold makes the rules, and the one that
58
has the gold under [then proposed] 5.4, is going to be a non-lawyer."'1
The commentary to Rule 5.4 as finally adopted by the ABA explains that
the prohibitions on nonlawyer involvement "are to protect the lawyer's
59
professional independence of judgment."'
A few examples help to illustrate this potential conflict. Suppose
that one partner of a lawyer-nonlawyer partnership is a real estate developer. The realtor may be trying to put together a real estate transaction
for a client, and have a great deal of the firm's time, potential profits, and
professional pride invested in it. In such a situation, the lawyer partner
who is asked to evaluate the proposed transaction for compliance with
the law will have a potential conflict of interest caused by her divided
loyalty to partner and client. Or, suppose that a nonlawyer entrepreneur
aiming to profit from the market for inexpensive, standardized legal services sets up a business organization that employs lawyers to provide such
services. There may be a tendency on the part. of the owner and management of such an organization to direct the lawyer employees to provide
less complete services than are needed by some clients because the services are not "cost justified." Such pressures from the employer may create a potential conflict of interest for the lawyer who owes loyalty to the
client, but also is worried about his job.
The possibility of interference with a lawyer's independent judgment
cannot be denied. But our present system contains similar possibilities.
Many lawyers work for a salary as associates for law firms in which they
have no control or ownership interest. Their employers-the partners or
lawyer shareholders-may be looking over the shoulders of those associates "in terms of profit" just as aggressively as would nonlawyers offering
the services of these same lawyers. Notwithstanding these pressures,
monetary and nonmonetary, we require and expect that such associates
will comply with their professional duties. Model Rule 5.2(a), for example, provides that "[a subordinate] lawyer is bound by the rules of profes158. Id. at 38 (remarks by Al Conant).
159. MODEL RULES, supra note 101, Rule 5.4 comment. Christensen, who has probably
studied the unauthorized practice of law area more than any other modern commentator, also
has argued that the possibility of interference with the lawyer's professional independence in
the interest of maximizing profit is the principal danger of nonlawyer involvement in the business of law. At one time, he was of the view that the risk of such danger justified a total ban on
involvement of nonlawyers in the business of law "for profit." B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note
13, at 280. On the basis of a detailed historical survey of the unauthorized practice movement
done ten years later, however, Christensen concluded that all unauthorized practice restrictions except those on the use of the titles "lawyer" and "attorney at law," and perhaps the
privilege of appearing in court, should be abolished. Christensen, supra note 12, at 210.
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sional conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acts at the direction of
160
another person."
In order to justify a prophylactic rule prohibiting all involvement by
nonlawyers in the business of law, those opposing nonlawyer involvement must show that somehow nonlawyer control is more pernicious, or
more efficacious, in interfering with a lawyer's professional independence, than the control by supervising or employer attorneys that is allowed currently. Otherwise the general injunctions on professional
independence should suffice. Yet, there is no evidence of such increased
power in nonlawyers.' 6 1 Moreover, nonlawyers are allowed to exercise a
comparable kind of control over lawyers in other contexts. Many lawyers working in the private sector, for example, are paid by nonlawyers
to provide legal services to another. This may happen when a parent
pays for a lawyer to assist a child; when insurance companies provide
counsel to defend an insured; or when corporations pay the legal expenses to defend their employees. In these situations, the attorney looks
to one party for payment, but owes her professional duties to another.
While these relationships undoubtedly present potential conflicts of
interest, they are not prohibited altogether.1 62 We assume that a lawyer
in many cases may be able to preserve professional independence even
though someone else has a financial interest in the services rendered.
Thus, Model Rule 5.4(c) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not permit a
person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal
services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.' 163 Model Rule 1.8(f) implies that
a lawyer may accept compensation from one person for representing another so long as "there is no interference with the lawyer's independence
of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship."' 6 4 Similarly, the conflicts rules require lawyers to decline to represent clients if
160. MODEL RULES, supra note 101, Rule 5.2(a).
161. Rhode, supra note 12, at 90-94. In Florida Bar v. Consolidated Business & Legal
Forms, Inc., 386 So.2d 797, 798-800 (Fla. 1980), the referee did conclude that clients had
received inadequate representation as a result of the inexperience of the employed lawyers, use
of inadequate form pleadings, lack of proper attention, and insistence on payment before services were provided. While the court apparently believed that these deficiencies were caused
because the corporation was organized by nonlawyers, there does not seem to be any warrant
for such a conclusion in the case.
162. See generally ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 99102 (1984) (discussing the legal background to Model Rule 1.8(f)).
163. MODEL RULES, supra note 101, Rule 5.4(c).
164. Id. Rule 1.8(f).
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they reasonably should conclude that representation will be adversely af1 65
fected by conflicting interests.
Anothpr very different type of control over lawyers by nonlawyers
occurs when a law firm in need of capital borrows funds from an institutional lender. 16 6 Such borrowing on occasion can be vital to the economic survival of a firm. 167 If a debtor firm wished to embark on a
potentially costly piece of litigation-perhaps on a pro bono or contingency basis-there would be a potential for conflict with an institutional
lender who concluded that the costly representation jeopardized the
firm's ability to repay the loan. But again, such borrowing is not prohibited. We assume that the general conflicts rules will be sufficient to protect against interference with the lawyer's professional judgment in such
cases.
Still another kind of control over lawyers by nonlawyers occurs
when lawyers are employed by corporations or governmental bodies to
work in legal departments. In an important sense, such employment is
distinguishable from the situations above because the corporation or government is the lawyer's client. 68 As client, the employer has a broad
165. Id. Rule 1.7.
Even if the lawyer can conclude reasonably that the representation will not be affected
adversely, she still must advise the client of the potential conflict, and obtain the client's consent to it before proceeding. Id. Thus, the general conflicts rules already require disclosure
and client consent to any latent conflicts of interest. These conflicts rules would apply equally
were nonlawyers involved in a cooperative enterprise with the lawyers, posing a potential conflict of interest. The disclosure obligation, by itself, should go a long way to ameliorating any
potential injury to clients arising from the interests of the nonlawyer. Note, supra note 14, at
658. Professor Rhode has observed that attorneys are not "well, let alone ideally, situated to
determine the risk that consumers are willing to assume in return for less expensive services."
Rhode, supra note 12, at 61. Perhaps this is an area in which the burden should be on the
profession to show why it should not leave the choice up to the consumer in the marketplace.
It may be objected that the situation in which someone else is paying for the services of a
lawyer to represent another is distinguishable from that in which someone is hoping to profit
from the lawyer's services. But that will depend upon who is paying for the lawyer, and the
relationship of that person to the real client. If it is an insurance company, for example, the fee
payer may well be hoping to profit, albeit indirectly, from the lawyer's services, because the
whole purpose of hiring a lawyer may be to avoid financial liability and thereby to enhance or
preserve profits.
166. The example is taken from HAZARD & HODES, supra note 14, at 473.
167. Shortly before its demise, the law firm of Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey was reported to have over $53 million in outstanding bank loans. Brill,
Bye, Bye, Finley, Kumble, AM. LAW., Sept. 1987, at 40. More recently it was reported that
when it collapsed, the firm owed $83 million to banks. Jensen, Finley Report Reveals Scrutiny,
Burglary, 10 Nat'l L.J., Aug. 22, 1988, at 2, col. 2.
168. Model Rule 1.13 makes clear, as does the case law, that "[a] lawyer employed or
retained by an organization represents the organization." MODEL RULES, supra note 101,
Rule 1.13. But see infra text accompanying notes 279-94 (discussing lawyers employed by
accounting firms).
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entitlement to control the lawyer's rendering of professional services, at
least as to the objectives of the representation.1 69 In another respect,
however, employment in the corporate and government sector creates
problems for the lawyer's professional independence comparable to those
that would exist if nonlawyers were entitled to offer lawyers' services to
the public. For example, while the lawyer employed by a corporation
generally takes orders only from a few of the corporation's duly authorized officers or employees, the lawyer is deemed to represent the organization as a whole.1 70 If the lawyer concludes that her superiors are
acting inconsistently with the best interests of the organizational client,
the lawyer is expected to act in the best interests of the client. 17 That is,
the lawyer is expected to remain professionally independent, notwithstanding the financial or political interest of the corporate or governmental official who has hired or supervised the lawyer. The fact that we
expect such professional independence of the organizational lawyer further undercuts the argument that such independence could not be maintained against nonlawyer employers in the business of law.
Significantly, the Supreme Court has found little support for the argument that nonlawyer involvement might impair a lawyer's professional
independence in the context of nonprofit organizations that provide the
services of lawyers to members. In three landmark cases, the Court upheld the right of labor unions to pay for or promote the services of particular lawyers for their members, 72 and to provide such services through
lawyers employed by the unions.173 In each case, state bar associations
opposed the arrangements on the ground that the interests of the union
would diverge from those of the clients, and the lawyers' professional
judgment would be impaired by the financial control exerted by the
union. The opponents of such union involvement, however, were unable
to come up with concrete evidence of injury to clients in any of the cases
and the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the argument as only "theoretically imaginable."' 174 As a direct result of these decisions, the ABA
169. Model Rule 1.2(a), for example, provides that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation." MODEL RULES, supra note 101, Rule
1.2(a) (emphasis added).
170. Id. Rule 1.13 & comment.
171. Id. Rules 1.13(b), (c).
172. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 580 (1971); Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); cf NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)
(establishing same principle for political organization).
173. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967).
174. Id. at 224.
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and most states amended their professional codes to allow nonprofit enti75
ties to offer the services of lawyers.
Lay interference in professional judgment seems no more likely
when the lay provider is motivated by monetary profit than when motivated by economic or political ideology. 176 Arguably there is less potential for interference when the nonlawyer's incentives are only monetary.
For example, lawyers in private practice depend on satisfied clients for
referrals and repeat business. Clients who conclude that their lawyer's
independent judgment is compromised are not likely to be satisfied.
Lawyers providing services to members of nonprofit institutions such as
labor unions may not have the same dependence on satisfied clients, and
may care more about satisfying the employing institution. Moreover,
their ideological loyalty to the nonprofit institution may be more personal and intense than is the private attorney's attachment to money.
Those who claim that lay involvement in the business of law would
be attended by grave conflicts of interest and interference with professional judgment, should be challenged to show why the potential
problems are any more serious here than they are in the kinds of law
practice currently allowed. Absent this showing, there is little reason to
suppose that the existing conflicts rules will not serve to police lawyers
who would engage in the business of law with nonlawyers.
Even assuming the potential for nonlawyer interference with a lawyer's professional judgment, it does not follow that a total prohibition of
nonlawyer involvement in the business of law is justified. As the Kutak
Commission showed, it is possible to draft a much narrower restriction
that authorizes nonlawyer entrepreneurial involvement if and only if
there is no such interference. 77 In effect, such a rule would impose an
implicit restriction on every lawyer's contract with a nonlawyer partner
preventing the nonlawyer from interfering with the lawyer's independence. Furthermore, the courts could require that an explicit provision
respecting the lawyer's independence be included in any contract between a lawyer and a nonlawyer before they were permitted to form a
business association that would offer the lawyer's services to others.178 A
comparable contractual commitment was recommended in the 1969
175. See supra text accompanying notes 80-90.
176. In re Educ. Law Center, 86 N.J. 124, 135, 429 A.2d 1051, 1057 (1981) ("[T]he corporation may place its own interests, whether political goals or profits, ahead of the interests of
its clients."); Billings, Legal Expense Insurers: Winning the Battle Against Indifferent Insurance Laws and Hostile Ethics Rules, 19 FORUM 142, 151 (1983).
177. Rule 5.4(a) (Proposed Draft 1982), reprinted in 107 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 886
(1982).
178. Billings, supra note 176, at 151, 159.
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Model Code to deal with the need for a lawyer to maintain professional
independence when employed by an organization. 179 Indeed, a similar
device was found workable by at least one court that wished to permit
nonlawyer involvement in the provision of legal services, while still
guarding against interference in the lawyer's independence. 180
(2) Nonlawyers Would Engage in InappropriateAdvertising and Solicitation of
Legal Business
Another argument frequently made against allowing nonlawyer involvement in the business of law is that the nonlawyers necessarily would
solicit legal business in violation of the advertising and solicitation rules.
The 1920 Delegates Report, for example, argued:
The sole inducement to the layman to practice law and do law business
is the fee derived therefrom, and to secure this recourse is had to the
ordinary commercial, competitive business methods of solicitation and
advertising thereby commercializing the profession of the law and the
law business, undermining the ethical and professional standards, and
destroying public confidence in the lawyers and the courts .... Is,
Similarly, many of the cases involving lawyer-nonlawyer partnerships or
corporations have focused on advertising and solicitation as the primary
82
evils involved.1
To the extent that these arguments historically have focused on the
evil of advertising per se, the Supreme Court's articulation of a constitutional right to advertise has rendered them largely obsolete.' 8 3 Nonetheless, deceptive and misleading advertising is prohibited.1 84 It still might
be argued that advertising of legal services by nonlawyer partners or corporations inherently would be misleading, since at a minimum the public
would be confused as to who is really furnishing the legal services. Per179. MODEL CODE, supra note 68, EC 5-24 provides: "Where a lawyer is employed by an
organization, a written agreement that defines the relationship between him and the organization and provides for his independence is desirable since it may serve to prevent misunderstanding as to their respective roles." See also Note, supra note 14, at 658 (advocating use of a
contract to prevent lay person from interfering with attorney's professional activities and attorney-client relationship).
180. In re Application of Am. Prepaid Legal Serv., Inc., No. 17132, slip op. at 1, 24 (Nev.
Feb. 6, 1987); NEV. SuP. CT. R. 42.5(c).
181. ANNOTATED CANONS, supra note 53, at 11.
182. See, eg., In re Cornelius, 520 P.2d 76, 85 (Alaska 1974); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n
v. Gold Shield, Inc., 52 Ohio Misc. 105, 113-14, 369 N.E.2d 1232, 1237 (C.P. Cuyahoga
County 1975); In re Droker, 59 Wash. 2d 707, 715, 370 P.2d 242, 246 (1962); State ex rel.
Lundin v. Merchants Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 15, 177 P. 694, 695 (1919).
183. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (1988); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 649 (1985); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350, 359 (1977).
184. See MODEL RULES, supra note 101, Rule 7.1.
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haps more important, in person solicitation of legal business by lawyers is
impermissible in most jurisdictions.' 18 5 Yet, the argument is made that
since nonlawyers are permitted to engage in such in person solicitation,
lawyers in partnership with nonlawyers would escape the solicitation
rules by having the nonlawyers conduct these promotional activities.
The short answer to these arguments is that to the extent that advertising and solicitation rules are applicable to lawyers, they should be enforced against law businesses containing nonlawyers as well. This, in
fact, was the answer given by the Kutak Commission. It would have
allowed nonlawyer involvement only so long as "the organization does
not engage in advertising or personal contact with prospective clients, if a
lawyer employed by the organization would be prohibited from doing so
by Rule 7.2 or Rule 7.3."186
Few would dispute, for example, that the rules against deceptive advertising are justified, whether applied to lawyer or nonlawyer. Therefore, if there is a danger that the public would be confused by the
advertisement of legal services by nonlawyers, then such advertisers
could be put to the burden of making their ads accurate, regardless of the
greater restrictions potentially placed on their ability to advertise. Likewise, there is little reason to suppose that coercive personal solicitation
when conducted by nonlawyers is any less deleterious than when engaged
in by lawyers. Hence, lawyers could be prohibited from assisting or encouraging nonlawyers who engage in personal solicitation. Indeed, the
existing rule prohibiting a lawyer from violating or attempting to violate
the Rules "through the acts of another" probably is broad enough to
1 87
constitute such a prohibition.
Even assuming that the advertising and solicitation rules were applied to nonlawyers involved in the business of law, there would still remain a wide area of nonlawyer-lawyer business cooperation that
presently is closed. Business organizations in which both lawyers and
nonlawyers held financial and managerial interests still could offer a
package of legal and nonlegal services to the public through nondeceptive
advertisements, and they could provide business to persons referred by
satisfied customers and friends.
Nonetheless, the existing solicitation rules might be quite restrictive
in one important respect. They might prohibit a lawyer from accepting a
185. Id. Rule 7.3; MODEL CODE, supra note 68, DR 2-103(A).
186. 107 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 886-87 (1982).
187. MODEL RULES, supra note 101, Rule 8.4(a). It might be appropriate, of course, to
prohibit nonlawyers from engaging in such personal solicitation under the consumer protection acts, whether they are associated with lawyers or not.
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"referral" from a nonlawyer partner or business associate who has been
consulted by a client on a nonlegal matter. Ethical rules currently pro-%
hibit a lawyer from giving a person something of value to promote one's
legal services, that is, to solicit on one's behalf.' 88 These prohibitions
might apply to referrals from a nonlawyer partner or business associate
on the theory that the lawyer would be giving "something of value," the
lawyer's association with the nonlawyer, in return for the referral.
In view of the analogous situation in a traditional law firm, this application of the solicitation rules makes little sense. Lawyers often personally solicit additional legal business from existing clients, and they
routinely refer clients to other attorneys in their firm. The referring lawyer undoubtedly has a financial interest in the firm obtaining the additional business; and some clients may be pressured into consulting the
lawyer or the lawyer's partner on these additional matters. Moreover,
the partner to whom another lawyer in the firm refers business is giving
"something of value," just as the lawyer in the nonlawyer-lawyer enterprise would. But we do not prohibit such intrafirm solicitation. Model
Rule 7.3, for example, only prohibits solicitation "from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or priorprofessional relationship."' 89 There has been no suggestion that it would be impermissible for
a lawyer to accept a referral from another lawyer in the firm who properly has solicited business from an existing client. Presumably, this exception for existing and former clients serves clients' interests well
because it is often to the client's advantage for a lawyer to pose additional
legal matters that may need resolution, and to have the same firm handle
the matter.
The same arguments that justify allowing this kind of intralaw firm
solicitation justify allowing solicitation within the context of a lawyernonlawyer firm. To a certain extent, the public currently receives the
benefit of a similar kind of solicitation and referral, even though lawyers
and nonlawyers may not form partnerships. Lawyer and nonlawyer professionals establish informal referral arrangements all the time. Banks,
188. Model Rule 7.2(c), for example, provides that "[a] lawyer shall not give anything of
value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services." Id. Rule 7.2(c).
189. Id. (emphasis added). The prior Model Code prohibits solicitation of business from
"a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer." MODEL
CODE, supra note 68, DR 2-103(A). It provides further that
[a] lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel ... shall not accept employment resulting from that advice, except that: (1) A
lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative, former client (if the advice
is germane to the former employment), or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes

to be a client.
Id. DR 2-104(A).
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realtors, and social workers, for example, refer clients to lawyers whose
work they have found to be of high quality, and lawyers make similar
referrals to nonlawyers. Often enough, the referral arrangements are reciprocal. One of the principal advantages of allowing nonlawyers to
form business associations with lawyers would be that such informal associations could become institutionalized. Clients could be offered a
more efficient and complete "one-stop" service, involving the expertise of
lawyer and nonlawyer alike, without hiring several different firms. In
order for this efficiency to be meaningful, however, the various professionals in such an enterprise must be free to refer clients from one to
another. As for the evils of solicitation and potential conflicts of interest,
the client who is aware of the lawyer or nonlawyer's business connections
with other professionals should be in a better position to resist inappropriate solicitation and conflicts than one who is not.
In short, the arguments against allowing nonlawyer-lawyer association based on the dangers of solicitation can be accommodated simply by
applying the existing advertising and solicitation rules to such associations. Insofar as the solicitation rules would preclude solicitations of
legal business from existing or former clients of the firm, as a whole, they
should be modified to allow such solicitation for the same reason that law
firms are allowed to engage in it.
(3) Client Confidences Would Be Compromised

Another area in which nonlawyer involvement in the business of law
is thought to create ethical risks is in the preservation of client confidences. Some have expressed concerns that nonlawyers associated with
lawyers improperly might seek disclosure of client confidences. A 1987
ABA Staff Memorandum, for example, worried that nonlawyer directors
might demand access to client confidences to aid the directors in formulating corporate strategy. 90 One also can envision a nonlawyer who
properly has learned confidences in connection with work undertaken for
a client, but who then improperly uses those confidences for personal
gain or discloses them to third persons.
There is little reason to suppose, however, that clients would have
any less protection of confidences than they do at present if the lawyers
with whom they wish to deal were affiliated directly with the nonlawyers.
A client, of course, is free to consent to the disclosure of confidences to
190. ABA Memorandum, Subject: Model Rule 5.4, at 7 (Apr. 22, 1987) (unpublished
memorandum available from ABA).
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persons other than the lawyer. 191 Furthermore, under the current Model
Rules, client consent to disclosure is implied insofar as is necessary "to
carry out the representation."'' 92 Presumably, a client would be deemed
to have consented to disclosure of information to nonlawyer associates at
the outset of the relationship, to the extent necessary to carry out the
representation. 93 Even now, if a client does not wish disclosure of confidences to a lawyer's partners and associates (whether or not they are
lawyers), he can instruct the lawyer not to disclose, and the lawyer is
bound by this instruction and subject to discipline for unauthorized use
or disclosure. 194 In turn, the nonlawyers should be liable for unauthorized use or disclosure of information to third persons either as agents of
95
the attorney associate, or as agents of the client, or both.
To a considerable extent, this problem is already encountered routinely by lawyers who need to enlist the help of nonlawyers with whom
they are not associated formally. For example, lawyers will retain accountants, economists, and other nonlawyer experts to help with a given
representation. While these professionals are not subject to the lawyer's
professional regulation, some are subject to an ethical duty imposed by
96
their own professional regulations to maintain such confidences.
Moreover, when such professionals are employed directly by the client,
they also owe duties as agents of the client not to profit from the client's
confidences. 197 Alternatively, if they are hired by the lawyer on behalf of
the client, they may owe a duty of loyalty to the employing attorney not
to disclose confidential information. The attorney-client privilege also
should extend to nonlawyers to whom confidences are disclosed in order
to provide legal advice to the client. 9 8 Finally, even if nonlawyers do
not have as broad a duty of confidentiality under traditional agency rules
191. Model Rule 1.6(a), for example, allows a lawyer to disclose confidences with the client's consent after consultation. MODEL RULES, supra note 101, Rule 1.6.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. Rule 1.6 comment ("A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a
client when appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent that the client's
instructionsor specialcircumstances limit that authority.") (emphasis added).
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY §§ 343, 379, 380 (1958); R. MALLEN & V.

LEVIT, supra note 148, § 35.
196. See, e.g., Rule 301 of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc.,
Rules of Conduct of the Code of Professional Ethics, reprintedin CODES OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY 239 (R. Gorlin ed. 1986) ("A member shall not disclose any confidential
information obtained in the course of a professional engagement except with the consent of the
client"); American Society of Chartered Life Underwriters, Code of Ethics, Guide 1.2, reprinted in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 266.
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958).
198. 8 J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2301, 2317 (1961).
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as is imposed under the lawyer ethics codes, 199 nonlawyer professionals

are free to agree to a broader duty of confidentiality as a contractual
matter.
Furthermore, client confidences would continue to be protected by
several existing professional rules. The lawyer who has been retained
would continue to be bound by the ethical duty to maintain client confidences, the duty to ensure that nonlawyer assistants comply with the
lawyer's professional duties, 2°° and the general rule that prohibits a lawyer from violating the confidentiality rule "through the acts of another."' 20 The lawyer also would be legally liable for malpractice if any
20 2
of the lawyer's partners disclosed confidences to the injury of a client.
Even if there were any uncertainty as to the lawyer's ethical responsibility for unauthorized disclosures by nonlawyer business associates, the
ethical rules could be amended to make this clear, as was proposed by the
Kutak Commission. 20 3 Or lawyers who form such business associations
with nonlawyers could be required to bind their business organization
2 4
contractually to maintain client confidences. 0
C.

Economic Protectionism

Although economic protectionism often can be read between the
lines of the justifications given for excluding nonlawyers from the business of law, it rarely is expressed publicly. 20 5 It did surface as early as
1920, when the Delegates Report complained that
[t]he layman, a natural person or corporate, may only compete with
the lawyer in the practice of law and the doing of law business by
orally soliciting and advertising to do it more expeditiously, faithfully,
imputing to
intelligently, and at less expense than the lawyer,20thereby
6
the lawyer slothfulness, infidelity, and extortion.

This justification was voiced more recently during the debates over the
Kutak proposal that the prohibitions be abolished. One frequently mentioned reason for opposing the Kutak proposal was that it would allow
199. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 242.
200. MODEL RULES, supra note 101, Rule 5.3.
201. Id. Rule 8.4(a).
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 213, 214 (1958); R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT,
supra note 148, §§ 33, 35.
203. MODEL RULES, supra note 101, Rule 5.4(b) (Proposed Draft 1982), reprintedin 107
REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 886-87 (1982).
204. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 14, at 470; Billings, supra note 176, at 151, 159.

Interestingly, Professors Hazard and Hodes refer to economic protectionism as the
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 14, at 471.
206. ANNOTATED CANONS, supra note 53, at 10-11 (quoting REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF DELEGATES OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS (1920)).
205.

"hidden rationale" behind the business canons.
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national corporations such as Sears, H & R Block, Montgomery Ward,
20 7
or the Big Eight accounting firms to open up for-profit law offices.
According to one delegate, this would result in a form of ruinous
competition:
You each have a constituency. How will you explain to the sole practitioner who finds himself with competition with Sears why you voted
for this? How will you explain to the man in the mid-size firm who is
being put out of business by the big eight law [sic] firm? How will you
explain that. I submit to you you cannot on the evidence that has been
brought to
you by the Commission, because there has been no such
20 8
evidence.
Whether protectionist sentiments did, in fact, play an important role
in defeating the Kutak proposal, they are not a legitimate justification for
the current prohibitions in light of the antitrust laws. For nearly a hundred years, federal law has prohibited "combination[s] ...inrestraint of
trade or commerce ....-209 According to Areeda and Turner, "[t]he
economic objective of a pro-competitive policy is to maximize consumer
economic welfare through efficiency in the use and allocation of scarce
resources, and via progressiveness in the development of new productive
techniques and new products that can put those resources to better
2 10
use."
The antitrust laws have been held applicable to the rules established
by state bar associations. For many years, the legal profession assumed
that it was not engaged in "trade or commerce" as contemplated by the
federal antitrust laws. But the Supreme Court soundly rejected that contention in the 1975 case of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,211 when it held
that minimum fee schedules published by a Virginia county bar association, and enforced by the state bar, constituted illegal price-fixing under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Generally industry self-regulation, such as that engaged in by the
legal profession, is evaluated for antitrust purposes under the rubric of
the group boycott. 2 12 A "group boycott" may be described as a con207. HOD Transcript, supra note 107, at 28, 37, 46-48.
208. Id. at 48-49 (remarks by Al Conant). Interestingly, the ABA does not mention the
concern about competition as one of the reasons for rejecting the Kutak proposal in its "official" legislative history of the rules. ABA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 99, at 160. The
contemporaneous Bureau of National Affairs report is more accurate. 51 U.S.L.W. 2493
(1983).
209. Sherman Antitrust Act, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1987)).
210. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 7 (1978).
211. 421 U.S. 773, 791-93 (1975).
212. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 88 (1977).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

certed effort by one group of persons to exclude others from their business. 2 13 Because the rules that this Article has been analyzing exclude

nonlawyers from the business of law, they constitute a group boycott.
Group boycotts such as this probably would be tested under a rule of
reason analysis and would be illegal only if found to suppress competition. 2 14 Moreover, a group boycott may be exempt from the antitrust
laws if it is mandated by state action.
The case law shows, however, that the rules under examination here
would be found to violate the antitrust laws if they were not mandated by
the state. In Surety Title Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, a
title company challenged opinions by the Unauthorized Practice of Law
Committee of the Virginia State Bar to the effect that nonlawyers conducting title searches without the assistance or supervision of lawyers
would be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 21 5 The trial court
held the bar activity constituted a classic illegal group boycott violative
of the antitrust laws regardless of whether it was evaluated under a per se
rule or a rule of reason test, and regardless of whether the plaintiff could
show an anticompetitive purpose. 2 16 Although the trial court's decision
in Surety Title was reversed on appeal, the soundness of the court's conclusion as to the bar's conduct, had it been the conduct of purely private
parties, was not thrown in doubt.
The antitrust cases involving the legal profession have been reinforced in the last ten years by cases involving other "learned" profes2 17
sions. In National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States,
for example, both the District of Columbia Circuit and the Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the Society's Code of Ethics rule, which prohibited competitive bidding for engineering services,
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. In particular, the Supreme Court
rejected the Society's defenses that (1) the rule was justified on the
ground that competition would jeopardize public safety, and (2) its right
21 8
to promulgate the rule was protected by the first amendment.
213. Id. § 83.
214. Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 222 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1210 (1984).
215. 431 F. Supp. 298, 302 (E.D. Va. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 571
F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 941 (1978).
216. Id. at 303-04, 304 n.8, 307-08; see also Justice Department Dismisses Antitrust Suit
Against American Bar Association, 64 A.B.A. J. 1538 (Oct. 1978) [hereinafter Justice Dep't]
(Justice Dep't memorandum cites dramatic changes in legal and regulatory climate of lawyer
advertising).
217. 435 U.S. 679 (1978), aff'g 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
218. Id. at 696-98.
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In American Medical Association v. Federal Trade Commission,219
the FTC alleged that the AMA, through its Principles of Medical Ethics
and its Opinions and Reports interpreting those Principles, had kept physicians from adopting more economically efficient business formats and
that these restraints had had an adverse effect on competition in violation
of the Federal Trade Act.2 20 In addressing the restrictions on business
associations with nonphysicians, the FTC concluded:
[T]he organizational impediments at issue here preclude on their face a
wide variety of professional ventures by physicians that may involve
some financial or other type of association with non-physicians (be
they lay persons or other health care professionals). It is difficult to see
how such sweeping ethical proscriptions are needed to prevent deception or to prevent non-physicians from having undue influence over
medical procedures, 22and,
not surprisingly, respondent offers no satis1
factory explanation.

Utimately, the FTC issued a cease and desist order enjoining the AMA
from restricting participation by nonphysicians in the ownership or management of organizations offering physicians' services. 2 22 The Second
Circuit affirmed 223 and that decision was affirmed later by an equally divided Supreme Court.
224
In Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,
the Supreme Court affirmed an FTC order finding that the Federation's
"work rule" forbidding its members from submitting x-rays to dental insurers in conjunction with claims forms constituted an unfair method of
competition under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and a
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Again, the Court did not accept the "learned professions" argument, rejecting the Federation's defense that the rule was justified by the need to ensure fully adequate care
for patients and that only dentists were competent to evaluate the diag225
nostic significance of x-rays.
Finally, in Wilk v. American Medical Association226 a federal district
court in Illinois recently found that the AMA's boycott of chiropractors,
through its Principles of Medical Ethics and other activities, violated sec219.

638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd mem. by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676

(1982).
220. American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. Decisions 701, 1017-18 (1979).
221. Id. at 1018 (footnote omitted); see also Clanton, The FTC and the Professions, 52
ANTITRUST L.J. 209, 219-20 (1983) (discussing application of antitrust laws to medical
profession).
222. American Medical Ass'n, 638 F.2d at 450.
223. Id. at 453; 455 U.S. 676.
224. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
225. Id. at 462-65.
226. 671 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. I1. 1987), on remandfrom 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983).
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tion 1 of the Sherman Act. Once again, a court rejected the Association's
22 7
claim that the boycott was justified in order to protect patients.
In view of these cases, it is hardly surprising that the FTC has taken
the position that the lawyer ethics rules prohibiting lawyers from forming legal services firms with nonlawyers should be abolished. In a series
of letters and petitions addressed to state courts before which proposed
revisions of ethics codes were or are pending, the FTC has urged the
courts to reject these restrictions. Relying on its examinations of similar
restrictions in the medical and optometric professions, the Commission
has argued that
Proposed Rule 5.4 would limit the ability of lawyers to establish multidisciplinary practices with other professionals, such as psychologists
or accountants, to deal efficiently with both the legal and nonlegal aspects of specific problems. [It] .

.

. also would appear to bar lawyers

from including any lay persons, such as marketing directors, as partners in their law firms. Finally, such a restriction would appear to
prohibit corporate practice, and thereby prevent the use of potentially
efficient business formats....
Proposed Rule 5.4 might limit potentially procompetitive professional
ventures, innovative business formats, and perhaps some forms of prepaid legal services. [It] ... might prevent lawyers from achieving sav-

ings in marketing that could be passed on to consumers. For example,
the proposed rule would not permit a retailer such as Sears to employ
attorneys to provide legal services to the public. If attorneys were permitted to enter into such an arrangement, it would be feasible for them
to advertise on a national scale and share advertising time with other
Sears service providers,
such as its insurance, stock brokerage, and re2 28
alty subsidiaries.
Unfortunately, while the existing rules governing the relations between lawyers and nonlawyers are incompatible with federal antitrust
policy, they have escaped enforcement because of the state action defense. Under that doctrine, anticompetitive activities carried out by private parties pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy that is
supervised actively by the state generally have been held exempt from the
federal antitrust laws. 229 The state action exemption has been held to
shelter lawyer rules of professional conduct when they have been adopted
227. Id. at 1481-85; see infra text accompanying notes 369-70.
228. Letter from Jeffrey I. Zuckerman, Director of FTC Bureau of Competition, to Robert
F. Stephen, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Kentucky 5-6 (June 8, 1987). Similar letters
have been sent by the FTC to courts or bar committees considering rule changes in North
Dakota, Hawaii, Alabama, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Georgia, Massachusetts, West Virginia, and
Florida. (copies available from the author); see also C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 898 n.36
(FTC investigation of bar association restrictions on collaborative enterprises between lawyers
and nonlawyers).
229.
Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1662-63 (1988); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558,
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by a state supreme court. 230 Thus, state court action adopting Rule 5.4,
or its predecessors under the older Code, would be immune from prosecution or private action under the antitrust laws. Furthermore, bar activity that is taken pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy," or otherwise ratified by a state supreme court,
probably would be exempt, provided that the state diligently supervises
23 1
the activity.
Even assuming that the states have the power to retain the current
restrictions, however, it does not follow that they should retain them.
The primary goal in state regulation of the legal profession ought to be
the public welfare. As the Supreme Court has stated, the states have
broad power to regulate the practice of professions "as part of their
'232
power to protect the public health, safety and other valid interests.
If, as this Article has argued, the traditional arguments based upon protection of clients or the public generally are inadequate to justify the
rules excluding nonlawyer involvement in the business of law, what other
"valid interest" can there be? Protection of the economic well-being of
the profession is not such a valid interest.
D. Summary
Traditionally, the opponents of lay involvement in the business of
law have presupposed that the potential for public harm is so serious in
this area as to justify a prophylactic rule prohibiting such involvement.
No empirical evidence, however, is available to show that the potential
for harm would become a reality if the prohibitions were lifted. Indeed,
comprehensive studies of the case law in the unauthorized practice area
have failed to disclose significant public harm resulting from such practice. 233 Moreover, there are other ethical rules in place to regulate law567-70 (1984); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1977); Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341, 250-51 (1943).
230. Bates, 433 U.S. at 360.
231. See Patrick, 108 S.Ct. at 1663; Hoover, 466 U.S. at 567-70. This is not to say, however, that some bar association activities-particularly those of local county bar associations or
state bar committees that occur without court supervision or mandate-may not be vulnerable.
On August 19, 1988, a 51-page complaint was filed in the federal court for the Northern District of Illinois by a public interest organization called "Lawline" against the American Bar
Association, the Illinois State Bar Association, and the Chicago Bar Association alleging,
among other things, that their activities in enforcing the business canons violate the federal
antitrust laws. Complaint, Lawline v. American Bar Ass'n, (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 19, 1988)
(No. 88C7203).
232. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
233. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222-24 (1967);
Christensen, supra note 12, at 215.
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yers, and there are legal rules binding on lawyers and nonlawyers alike.
In the absence of any showing that harm is likely to result from increased
lay involvement in the business of law, these ethical and legal rules
should be regarded as sufficient to protect the public from the dangers
that have been feared from lay participation. Even if these rules are
found inadequate, they can be amended to deal with the potential risks
from nonlawyer involvement in a way that is far less restrictive than the
present absolute ban. More limited rules, most of them already present
in the lawyer codes, will suffice to protect attorney independence, client
confidentiality, and the consumer's freedom of choice-the interests that
are potentially at risk in this area.
One justification-economic protectionism-is rarely heard in public, but undoubtedly has played an important role in practice in preserving the business restrictions on lay involvement. That justification,
however, is incompatible with our national policy against anticompetitive
economic behavior.
III.

Affirmative Reasons for Supposing that Participation by
Nonlawyers Would Be in the Public Interest

In the recent debates over the Kutak proposal to abolish the exclusion of nonlawyers from the business of law, one member of the House of
Delegates argued that the proposal should be rejected because no one
could say for sure what effect it would have: whether it would affect
lawyers' independence; whether it would destroy the economic existence
of some lawyers; or whether it would lead to cheaper or better services. 234 The foregoing discussion has argued that nonlawyer involvement
need not impair lawyers' independence, and that the question whether it
would destroy the economic existence of some lawyers should be irrelevant as a matter of public policy. The delegate's argument also suggests,
however, that there is no reasonable basis for believing that removing the
present restrictions would result in cheaper and better services to the
consumer. This section responds to that suggestion by showing that
there is a need and demand for innovative arrangements between lawyers
and nonlawyers that would provide multidisciplinary services to the public, and would provide infusions of capital to enable these organizations
to serve the public better and more efficiently. Unfortunately, the restrictions excluding nonlawyers from the business of law are operating as a
restraint on such innovation.
234.

HOD Transcript, supra note 107, at 37-38 (remarks by Al Conant).
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A. The Need for the Multidisciplinary Firm
Perhaps the most serious impediment imposed by the traditional restrictions is in the development of the "multidisciplinary firm." The idea
the multidisciplinary firm recognizes is that the law is increasingly interrelated to many fields that traditionally have been viewed as "nonlegal,"
such as economics, business, engineering, management, medicine, and
psychology. A multidisciplinary firm could offer expertise not only in
the law, but also in one or more of these law related fields.
There are many potential benefits to clients from a multidisciplinary
firm. 235 In the traditional law firm, there is inevitably a tendency to analyze a problem solely in terms of its legal aspect and for the lawyers to
attempt to solve the problem with whatever training they may have.
This may have one of two potentially harmful consequences: (1) the lawyers may fail to perceive or may ignore important nonlegal aspects; or (2)
the lawyers may identify the nonlegal aspect of a client's problem, but
may attempt to solve it themselves without adequate nonlegal training,
rather than referring the client elsewhere. In the multidisciplinary firm,
this need not happen. In the first instance, the firm would have the ability to diagnose more accurately whether a given client's problem is
strictly speaking a "legal" one, or, for example, an economic, psychological, or scientific one, or a combination of fields. Then, instead of referring the client to another firm or professional for the nonlegal needs, the
multidisciplinary firm itself could provide those services. Thus, the firm
could address all aspects of the client's problem, rather than only the socalled "legal aspect."
Even if a traditional law firm had the competence to diagnose the
presence of nonlegal problems, and the prudence to refer the client to
other professionals for the solution of those problems in which it lacked
the necessary expertise, the multidisciplinary firm would be able to provide the required services to the client more efficiently and economically.
The client would not need to find and work with two or more unrelated
firms; much of the information required to solve the client's problem
would need to be obtained only once; and the professionals themselves
would find it much easier to collaborate if they were in the same firm
than if they were in different firms. There also may be managerial and
235.

See generally Evans & Wolfson, Cui Bono-Who Benefits from Improved Access to

Legal Services, in LAWYERS AND THE CONSUMER INTEREST 24-25 (R. Evans & M. Trebil-

cock eds. 1982) (lawyers may keep work that could be done more efficiently and expertly by a
specialist in another field); Quinn, MultidisciplinaryLegal Services and Preventive Regulation,
in LAWYERS AND THE CONSUMER INTEREST, supra, at 329 (multidisciplinary firms have

many advantages, but are limited severely by the current disciplinary rules).
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administrative economies of scale for the multidisciplinary firm offering a
236

variety of services.
There can be little doubt that there is a market for such a multidisciplinary firm. Indeed, to a certain extent, law firms have begun to provide multidisciplinary services despite the existing constraints on
nonlawyer involvement in management and ownership of law firms.
First, law firms have begun hiring nonlawyer professionals as employees

to provide law-related professional services. 237 This clearly is permissible
under the rules. 238 But it suffers from the inherent limitation of all employment relationships: the nonlawyer professional is relegated to a permanent employee status. 239 He is prohibited expressly from owning a
financial interest in the firm if its practice includes law, or from otherwise
"sharing" legal fees with lawyers in the firm. 24 0 These prohibitions are
softened, to some extent, by the proviso that "a lawyer or law firm may
include nonlawyer employees in a compensation ...

plan, even though

'24 1
the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement."
But profit sharing is not the same as ownership. It does not carry with it
the same sense of professional status or financial responsibility for the
work of the firm. Moreover, the rules continue to preclude a nonlawyer
242
from having the managerial responsibility of a full partner.
It is, of course, impossible to know to what extent current restrictions discourage nonlawyers from accepting employment with law firms.
One suspects that the likelihood of this occurrence increases the more
experienced and qualified the nonlawyer professional. 243 For example, a

236.

Quinn, supra note 235, at 334.

237.

Lauter, Using Non-Lawyers: "Outsiders" Who Work for Firms, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 6,

1984, at 1, col. 4.
238. EC 3-6 of the 1969 Code advised that delegation of tasks to "clerks, secretaries, and
other lay persons" was proper provided "the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with his
client, supervises the delegated work, and has complete professional responsibility for the work
product." 94 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 756 (1969); see also ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Formal Op. 316 (1967), reprinted in FORMAL AND INFORMAL OPINIONS, supra note
95, at 7-8. Such employment has become so commonplace that the current Model Rules do
not even address its permissibility, confining themselves instead to delineating the lawyer's
responsibility for the nonlawyer's work. MODEL RULES, supra note 101, Rule 5.3.
239. Quinn, supra note 235, at 339.
240. MODEL RULES, supra note 101, Rules 5.4(a), (b), (d)(1).
241. Id. Rule 5.4(a)(3); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 1440 (1979) (when compensation structure relates to net profits, rather than to
particular fees, it does not constitute fee-splitting with a nonlawyer), reprintedin FORMAL AND
INFORMAL OPINIONS, supra note 95, at 341.
242. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 316 (1967), reprinted in FORMAL AND INFORMAL OPINIONS, supra note 95, at 7-8; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Formal Op. 303 (1961), reprinted in ABA OPINIONS, supra note 64, at 661.
243. Quinn, supra note 235, at 339. Arthur Rothkopf, of Hogan & Hartson, commented
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625

psychiatrist might hesitate to enter into a multidisciplinary enterprise
with a lawyer-perhaps to offer mediation or other psychological and
legal services-unless she were given equal status with the lawyer. If
these surmises are correct, then the relegation of the nonlawyer to an
employee status stands in the way of the most potentially valuable multidisciplinary innovations.
Another way in which lawyers have begun to offer multidisciplinary
services is by setting up so-called "nonlaw" affiliate businesses. 244 In the
last five years, at least fifteen major firms across the country have established affiliate businesses offering consulting and other services in such
areas as economics, education, management, energy, international business, employee benefits, finance, real estate, and advertising. 245 Clearly
this trend is occurring to meet the demand for multidisciplinary
services.

24 6

There are several problems, however, with law firm diversification.
First, the ethical permissibility of such nonlaw affiliates has never been
addressed squarely in any of the ethical codes, and it has only been addressed sporadically in the ethics opinions. 247 The jurisdiction most tolat a recent symposium that his firm set up its health care affiliate as a separate enterprise
because the person who wished to run it "wanted to run his own organization ....
[He] did
not want to be an employee of Hogan & Hartson after having been an employee of a Big Eight
firm." Transcript of Proceedings of Conference Sponsored by the American Lawyer, The 80s
Shakeout: An Update 381 (June 1, 1987) [hereinafter American Lawyer Transcript].
244. See, e.g., Saltonstall & Lane, Consultancies Develop with Specialties, Client Needs,
Nat'l L.J., June 6, 1988, at 25, col. 1; Lewin, Outside Ventures Transform Law Firms, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 11, 1987, at D1, col. 3; Stille, The Lure of Bigger Profits: When Law Firms Start
Their Own Businesses, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 21, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
245. Saltonstall & Lane, supra note 244, at 25, col. 1; Lewin, supra note 244, at D7, col. 1;
Stille, supra note 244, at 1, col. 1.
246. William Isaac, who heads the Secura Group, a bank consulting partnership set up by
Arnold & Porter, put it this way: "'The law firm environment makes sense for what I'm
doing.... We spin off legal work, and they spin off consulting work, so there's synergy. And
since we don't do legal work, we're not competing with them in any way, as we might have
been at other kinds of institutions.'" Lewin, supra note 244, at D1, col. 5. Another partner at
Arnold & Porter, Myron Curzan, agrees that "'[i]t gives you an edge if you can offer one-stop
shopping to your clients.'" Stille, supra note 244, at 21. Richard Noland, a partner at Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, which has set up an energy consulting firm, commented that
we frequently had situations where our clients would come to us and it would immediately become apparent that not only did they need legal services but they also had
need of expert consulting services in these areas ....
It became apparent to us that
there was a real opportunity here to develop some additional business in the nonlegal area by making available to our clients the services that they were seeking
elsewhere.
American Lawyer Transcript, supra note 243, at 349 (remarks by Richard Noland).
247. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1445 (1980)
(permissible for two lawyers and one economist to form corporation that would provide litigation support to lawyers), reprinted in FORMAL AND INFORMAL OPINIONS, supra note 95, at
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erant of law firm diversification seems to be the District of Columbia. A
1985 District of Columbia ethics opinion dealt with the case of a lawyer
who wanted to form a partnership or professional corporation with a
nonlawyer lobbyist "for the purpose of assisting clients who seek government contracts. '248 The lawyer was to set up a separate law practice to
perform any legal work that clients of the nonlaw partnership might require. The opinion concluded that this arrangement was permissible
"[s]o long as [the] partnership composed of a lawyer and a non-lawyer
does not render legal services. ' 24 9 Moreover, the lawyer was entitled to
handle any legal work generated by the clients of the partnership if the
lawyer maintained an independent professional judgment and maintained
the clients' confidences. 2 50 The ethics committee also concluded that solicitation of law business for the lawyer by the nonlaw partnership was
permissible under the District of Columbia Ethics Code so long as the
25 1
solicitation was not deceptive or the result of undue influence.
On its face, this opinion seems to open the door wide for the kind of
law firm diversification that has been going on for the last several years.
But the appearance is deceptive. First, the opinion necessarily is predicated on the assumption that the affiliate organization would not render
"legal services." The likelihood that no such services would be rendered
seems slim since the organization would be owned in whole or in part by
lawyers, and, in most instances, would be giving advice in a "law-related" area such as lobbying, education, real estate, accounting, or financial consulting.2 5 2 Second, while the opinion concludes that the affiliate
would not violate the solicitation rules, the District of Columbia solicitation rule is much more liberal than that in most jurisdictions, and bans in
person solicitation only if the solicitation involves deception or undue
influence. 253 Finally, the District of Columbia bar seems to be much
more liberal in accepting such innovative law firm developments than
other jurisdictions. 254 Thus, the existing ethical restrictions on associa353 ; N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 536 (1981) (permissible for lawyers to organize a financial planning corporation in which they would be the sole shareholders and employees and to
accept clients of the corporation as law clients, provided they did not use the corporation to
engage in impermissible solicitation), reprinted in 4 STATE OPINIONS, supra note 58.
248. District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 146, reprinted in 113 DAILY
WASH. L. REP. 525 (Mar. 18, 1985) [hereinafter Opinion 146].
249. Id. at 530.
250. Id. at 529.
251. Id. at 530.
252. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (1972),
reprinted in FORMAL AND INFORMAL OPINIONS, supra note 95, at 62.
253. District of Columbia Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-103.
254. Opinion 146, supra note 248, at 530 n.2, ventured to question whether the relevant
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tions between lawyers and nonlawyers in most jurisdictions will continue
to operate as significant constraints on the way in which such affiliates
2 55
are structured.
Assuming, however, that such nonlaw affiliates are permitted to approximate the multidisciplinary firm described above and to provide equity and managerial roles to nonlawyers, one is forced to ask what the
implications of such a movement are for the traditional prohibitions that
remain in the ethical codes. As Stephen Brill stated at a recent confer-

ence, "[I]sn't all this elaborate bookkeeping and separation which, of
course, is done for precisely the ethical code reasons. . . , isn't it all sort
of a charade?" 2 56 If the prohibitions can be circumvented by careful
structuring of affiliate entities, then there is little justification left for the
prohibitions found in the ethical codes. 2 57 Moreover, there remain
strong reasons for eliminating the restrictions. It must be assumed that it
takes a certain size law firm to justify the expense of setting up a nonlaw
affiliate. Thus, allowing covert circumvention of the rules by firm diversification favors the large, powerful urban law firms at the expense of the

smaller law practices.
B.

The Need for Professional Management

Quite apart from the need for multidisciplinary firms, there are a
variety of other potential benefits to the legal profession and to society
interests in protecting a lawyer's professional independence and a client's confidences required
the current blanket prohibition on law partnerships and corporations composed of both lawyers and nonlawyers. But it deferred to the District of Columbia committee considering
whether to adopt the ABA Model Rules for resolution of this question. Id. Recently the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals has proposed to depart significantly from ABA Model
Rule 5.4 and to allow nonlawyers to have beneficial and managerial interests in law firms. The
form of the rules proposed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would approximate
the Kutak Commission Proposed Rule 5.4, see supra note 104, except that it would not allow a
business organization owned by both lawyers and nonlawyers to do anything except practice
law and nonlawyers would be required to perform professional services for the firm. D.C.
ProposedRule, supra note 117, at 44. See generally Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 14, at 392400 (outlining the efforts at reform by the District of Columbia Bar Committee).
255. One lawyer who has been involved in such a diversification stated at a recent conference: "The reason, to a large degree, we've set it up the way we have is because of the ethical
rules." American Lawyer Transcript, supra note 243, at 360 (remarks by Richard Noland).
In particular, there seems to have been a real reluctance on the part of many law firms that
have diversified to allow nonlawyers an ownership interest in the affiliates that have been created, notwithstanding that the affiliates routinely are characterized as "non-legal." The affiliates usually are set up as separate partnerships by the partners of the law firm with only
lawyers or law firms as partners. Id. at 352-53, 389-91. But see id. at 371-72 (indicating that
none of the managing partners of the Hogan & Hartson affiliate are lawyers, although the law
firm is a limited partner whose consent is required for major actions).
256. Id. at 359.
257. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 14, at 477.
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that might flow from abandoning the current restrictions. One such benefit would be the "professionalization" of law firm management. Professional managers may be far better than lawyers at determining how
quality legal services may be delivered most efficiently and at the lowest
cost to the consumer. Canadian economists, for example, have observed
that historically there has been an underutilization of auxiliary or
paraprofessional personnel and a correlative excessive and inefficient use
of lawyers in the legal profession in that country. 258 One reason suggested for this underutilization of paraprofessionals is that the professionals who provide the services are also, under prevailing regulatory
regimes, the entrepreneurs. 25 9 The problem, as one economist sees it, is
that the entrepreneur-professionals "with idle time will tend to underuse
' 26 °
auxiliaries and essentially 'featherbed' to hold up their own earnings. "
He suggests that the only way to remedy this misallocation of resources
would be a shift in the identity of the entrepreneur: "[T]he critical point
is that the management of at least some professional firms will have to be
exercised by cost minimizers who are not simultaneously selling their
'26 1
own services to the firm."
To some extent, firms have begun to realize the value of professional
management. In some firms, lawyers with particular training or talent
for management have taken over the managerial reins. But lawyers with
such training and talent are not as plentiful as they might be; and often
firms rotate management among their partners as a task that needs to be
done, but which few enjoy as much as practicing law. Other firms, however, have recognized the need to reach beyond their legal staff and have
hired nonlawyers as office managers. Some nonlawyer managers may
find the possibility of high salaries and profit-sharing arrangements attractive enough to justify taking such a position without the expectation
of other entrepreneurial rewards, although the possibility of an ownership role would be much more meaningful to many professional
262
managers.
258. Evans & Wolfson, supra note 235, at 3, 13 & n.6; Zemans, The Non-Lawyer as a
Means of Providing Legal Services, in LAWYERS AND THE CONSUMER INTEREST, supra note
235, at 268-76.
259. Evans, Professionalsand the Production Function: Can Competition Policy Improve
Efficiency in the Licensed Professions in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION 225,
240-44 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1980); Evans & Wolfson, supra note 235, at 14.
260. Evans & Wolfson, supra note 235, at 14; see also Evans, supra note 259, at 248-49
(discussing prices charged by the lawyer-entrepreneur).
261. Evans, supra note 259, at 249; see also Evans & Wolfson, supra note 235, at 15, 24
(efficient use of auxiliary personnel will reduce the cost of services, but this will not happen
while professionals are also entrepreneurs).
262. Brill, supra note 5, at 102.

March 1989]

NONLAWYERS IN THE BUSINESS OF LAW

The managerial authority of such nonlawyers necessarily is limited
in other ways by the current ethical restrictions on nonlawyer involvement. The Model Rule on professional law corporations makes the point
most explicitly. Not only are nonlawyers prohibited from being shareholders, they also are prohibited from serving as corporate directors or
officers or from having a right to "direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer. '263 The restriction on serving as a director or officer
seems to preclude a nonlawyer from having any real authority over decisions that matter to the firm's financial well-being. A director or officer,
for example, normally would make decisions about how the firm's personnel resources are to be allocated, what sorts of new business the firm
should try to attract, how to go about recruiting new lawyers and support staff, and which personnel to retain or terminate. Why nonlawyers
should be excluded from such functions has never been explained satisfactorily. It is, of course, possible that a nonlawyer hired by a firm could
be given such decisionmaking responsibility without calling him an officer or director. But this would clearly contravene the intent of the restriction, even if not its letter.
The restriction on nonlawyers "directing" or "controlling" a lawyer's professional judgment is slightly more complicated. It is justified
insofar as it is designed to prevent a nonlawyer from interfering with the
lawyer's exercise of her professional judgment in any particular representation. The restriction, however, is written more broadly than that. It is
unclear as to what constitutes a lawyer's "professional judgment," and
even more unclear as to what would constitute "direction" of such judgment. Would it be impermissible under this portion of the rule for a
nonlawyer office manager to decide that the lawyers in the office should
commit themselves to a certain amount of pro bono activity? Or that
they should pursue certain specialties for which they have shown a particular talent? On one interpretation, these may not be matters of a lawyer's professional judgment at all, but rather matters of entrepreneurial
judgment. But under another interpretation, they may fall within a lawyer's professional judgment. If so, then the rule may be unnecessarily
restrictive without any compensating benefit grounded in protecting the
integrity of law practice.
C. The Need for Capital
Another potential benefit that might flow from eliminating the restrictions on nonlawyer ownership of law firms is that law firms could
263.

MODEL RULES, supra note 101, Rule 5.4(d).
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raise capital from private nonlawyer investors, rather than borrowing
necessary capital. 264 Law firms might even "go public. ' 265 Investors
could provide working capital for innovative marketing, practice, and
management strategies. Additionally, a firm could use such capital to
initiate training programs for new lawyers, or for existing lawyers in new
areas. It also could devote some of the capital to advertising or to innovative mechanisms for providing legal services to portions of the population that otherwise might not be served. It might even allocate some of
this capital to financing pro bono activity.
The principal objections to allowing law firms to sell shares to
nonlawyers have been discussed earlier, 266 but two of them need to be
reexamined briefly. First, it is feared that investors would put even more
pressure than presently exists on the firm to maximize profits, thus driving down the quality of services and the ethical integrity of the lawyers in
the firm. Although there is no empirical evidence for this prediction,
there is reason for concern given our general knowledge of investor behavior. Nonetheless, there are less restrictive ways of responding to this
concern than flat prohibition of such investments. Steven Brill has suggested, for example, that a prospectus issued by a firm seeking outside
investors might be required to disclose that "maximizing shareholder return is not the firm's sole goal or even its constant priority. ' 267 Once
appropriate disclosures were made, the market would decide whether the
shares were a good buy. 26 8 If it decided that they are worth the risk, then
the lawyers in the firm would be free to continue practicing law under the
same ethical constraints as before, but without the same financial
constraints.
The second objection is related to the first: the nonlawyer shareholders would so control the firm that they would interfere inevitably
with the lawyers' exercise of professional judgment. 269 As discussed ear264.

R. BILLINGS, JR., PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 152 (1981); C. WOLFRAM, supra note

12, at 878-79; Note, supra note 14, at 660. Joseph Flom, a senior partner at Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom, a large New York law firm, reports that the firm has more than $100
million in capital tied up, about one-half of current annual revenues. Brill, supra note 5, at
102. He estimates that for a rapidly expanding firm such as his, this is just a fraction of the
investment any other type of business would be making. He believes that the firm clearly could
put much more to good use, and probably would, if the investment did not come directly out
of partners' pockets. Other firms agree that they need to tie up capital at one-half to twothirds of current revenue, but concede that most do not deploy that much. Id.
265. Brill, supra note 5, at 3.
266. See supra section II(A), (B).
267. Brill, supra note 5, at 102.
268. Id.
269. See supra section II(B)(1).
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lier, it is questionable whether professional judgment would suffer as a
result of nonlawyer control. Moreover, even if this is a legitimate concern there is a less restrictive alternative to the current flat prohibition.
Any firm that wished to raise capital by publicly offering shares could be
required to have two classes of stock, one for insiders, the lawyers who
would retain control of the firm, and the other for outsiders who were
attracted sufficiently to the firm as a financial investment, but with no
real desire for control.2 70 Whether investors would find such stock attractive would be a question for the market.
D. The Need for Consistency
The final argument for allowing nonlawyer involvement in the business of law is one based on fundamental principles of fairness. Lon
Fuller has described eloquently eight principles of legality towards which
any good legal system must aspire.2 7 1 One of the principles that he identified is that there should not be contradictions in the system. 2 72 Stated
affirmatively, legal rules should be consistent with one another. Similarly, John Rawls has noted that consistency is a fundamental principle
273
of formal justice, which is a precondition for the rule of law.
Many of the foregoing criticisms of the existing business canons
have been based on the observation that the present rules simply fail to
treat similar cases similarly. For example, a lawyer is prohibited from
working for a nonlawyer who offers the lawyer's services to the public,
but she is not prohibited from representing one client while being paid by
a third person. A lawyer is prohibited from raising capital by giving the
"investor" a share of his law firm profits or assets, but he may borrow
from nonlawyers to raise the same capital. 274 A lawyer is prohibited
from forming a partnership with a nonlawyer if the lawyer wants to practice law in the partnership, but she may hire a nonlawyer who is paid on
a profit-sharing basis. 27 5 Nonprofit organizations like unions are entitled
to offer the services of lawyers to their members, but for-profit organiza270. Brill, supra note 5, at 3.
271. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 41-94 (rev. ed. 1969)
272. Id. at 65-70.
273. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 58-60 (1971). Specifically, Rawls stated:
The desire to follow rules impartially and consistently, to treat similar cases similarly, and to accept the consequences of the application of public norms is intimately
connected with the desire, or at least the willingness, to recognize the rights and
liberties of others and to share fairly in the benefits and burdens of social
cooperation.
Id. at 60.
274. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 14, at 474.
275. Id. at 477.
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tions are not. 276 Thus, many situations that are functionally the same are
treated differently, demonstrating a basic inconsistency in our lawyer
codes with respect to the business canons.
There is a further problem of consistency, however, that must be
explored. The most complex of the eight principles of legality enumerated by Professor Fuller is the requirement that there be "congruence
between official action and declared rule."' 277 Similarly, John Rawls
noted that "[o]ne kind of injustice is the failure of judges and others in
authority to adhere to the appropriate rules or interpretations thereof in
deciding claims. ' 278 Most legal theorists would agree that regardless of
the substantive wisdom of a particular rule, it is a separate indictment of
the rule that it is not enforced consistently. It is that indictment of the
rules prohibiting nonlawyer involvement in the business of law that now
must be examined.
As has been shown in section I, those rules remain on the books in
every American jurisdiction. When bar association ethics committees
are asked to interpret those rules, they continue to make it clear that they
mean what they say: partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers are
not allowed, and lawyers may not work for nonlawyers who are offering
the lawyers' services to the public. Clearly these rules, as written, and as
interpreted, act as a deterrent to the forms of business activity that have
been discussed at some length. Nonetheless, despite the numerous bar
ethics opinions that have been issued on these prohibitions over the last
twenty years, they have been enforced only sporadically.
One explanation for the lack of enforcement might be that the
prohibitions have been in place so long that there are few violations, and
thus few occasions for cases to arise. There are, however, significant areas of practice in which nonlawyer involvement in the business of law has
become endemic, revealing the inadequacy of this explanation. The first
is in the accounting profession. The second is in the business of for-profit
group legal services.
(1) The Practiceof Law by Accounting Firms
Over thirty years ago, Dean Erwin Griswold of the Harvard Law
School noted a phenomenon that, at the time, was apparently just developing: the large accounting firm that hired full-time lawyers to provide
legal service to the firm's clients. 279 Griswold viewed this as a "bad"
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 477-78.
L. FULLER, supra note 271, at 81.
J. RAWLS, supra note 273, at 59.
Dean Griswold described the trend:

March 1989]

NONLAWYERS IN THE BUSINESS OF LAW

development, a "doubtful practice, '280 and questioned whether accounting firms could ethically employ lawyers to take care of the legal needs of
the firm's clients.2 8 ' At Griswold's suggestion and under his guidance,
the ABA looked into these practices and issued a variety of statements
that attempted to delineate the appropriate limits of lawyer involvement
with accounting firms. Little, however, changed as a result of this early
investigation.
Today, lawyers are employed routinely by accounting firms to advise accounting firm clients on tax matters. 28 2 Moreover, many of these

lawyers go on to become principals of the accounting firms. While it is
difficult to reconcile this practice with the prohibitions that have been
discussed, two explanations are usually offered.
First, the accounting firms usually do not hold these lawyers out to
their clientele as "practicing law" or as "lawyers. '283 Instead, the lawyers are called members of the "tax department" or some similarly oblique term. Consequently, defenders of the practice contend there is no
violation of the ethical rules prohibiting nonlawyers from offering the
services of lawyers to the public, or those prohibiting partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers.2 84 This explanation assumes, however,
that one can avoid the prohibitions merely by changing a lawyer's title
without changing the lawyer's actual job. That assumption has been rejected flatly by the ABA ethics opinions.2 85 Lawyers who interpret the
tax laws and decisions for individual clients of the accounting firms are
Some of these firms, however, have I am told, law departments, where legal advice is
given. Sometimes these law departments do extensive tax planning. When the accountants working for this firm . . . encounter what they feel to be a tax problem,
they may not call in [an outside] lawyer, but rather send the whole matter to their
firm's legal department .... Thus we have something developing which is pretty
close to the corporate practice of law ....
Of course, an accounting firm could hire a lawyer to advise it on its own legal
problems. But that is not the situation to which I refer. What I have in mind are
lawyers who perform legal services for clients of the accounting firm.
Griswold, A FurtherLook- Lawyers and Accountants, 41 A.B.A. J. 1113, 1179 (1955) (excerpting remarks by Griswold at the annual meeting of the Section of Taxation of the ABA).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. M. STEVENS, THE BIG EIGHT 143-45 (1981); Lawyers and Certified PublicAccountants: A Study ofInterprofessionalRelations, 56 A.B.A. J. 776, 778 (1970) [hereinafter Lawyers
and CPAs]; Middleton, A Tense Time, 69 A.B.A. J. 1020, 1020 (1983); American Lawyer
Transcript, supra note 243, at 406.
283. M. STEVENS, supra note 282, at 144.
284. See, e.g., Lawyers and CPAs, supra note 282, at 778.
285. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1241
(1973), reprintedin 2 INFORMAL ETHICS, supra note 91, at 495; ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Formal Op. 297 (1961), reprinted in ABA OPINIONS, supra note 64, at 652, 654.
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engaged in the "practice of law" by any accepted definition of the
phrase. 2 86 The only clear way in which a lawyer can avoid holding himself out as a lawyer is to withdraw from activities that constitute the
practice of law.
The second justification that might be given for the employment of
lawyers by accounting firms begins with the observation that you do not
need to be a lawyer to advise clients on matters of federal tax law. For
example, accountants who are not lawyers are entitled to advise their
clients on matters of federal tax law. Thus, some might argue that there
is an exception in the area of tax law to the usual prohibitions on lawyers
combining with nonlawyers.
Like the first justification, however, this argument also contains a
dubious premise: that the traditional prohibitions on lawyer collaboration with nonlawyers do not apply when the nonlawyers could carry on
the activity without lawyer collaboration. Stated another way, the assumption is that lawyers may combine with nonlawyers in the practice of
law when the activity, if carried on by the nonlawyers, would not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Although this assumption may
have much to recommend it as a policy matter, there is no authoritative
support. In 1973, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility rejected this precise contention. 287 More recently, it also has
been rejected by the ethics committees of several state bar associations,
including that of New York State, where most of the large accounting
288
firms are centered.
This second possible defense for the practice of law by lawyers
working for accounting firms faces another problem as well. The authorization for nonlawyers to practice tax law is narrow, limited by federal
regulation to practice before the IRS and the Tax Court. 28 9 In particu286.

See MODEL CODE, supra note 68, EC 3-5; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and

Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (1972), reprinted in

FORMAL AND INFORMAL

supra note 95, at 62, 65. In an important early unauthorized practice decision,
Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 188-89, 52 N.E.2d 27, 34 (1943), the court held that
the preparation of simple tax returns did not constitute the practice of law. But the court was
careful to note that if the service provided involved "examination of statutes, judicial decisions,
and departmental rulings, for the purpose of advising upon a question of law relative to taxation, and the rendering to a client of an opinion thereon," it clearly did constitute the practice
of law. Id. at 187, 52 N.E.2d at 33.
287. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1241 (1973),
reprinted in 2 INFORMAL ETHICS, supra note 91, at 495.
288. Professional Ethics Comm'n of the Bd. of Overseers of the Me. Bar, Op. 79 (1987),
digested in 3 LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 45, at 187 (1987); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics
Op. 557 (1984), reprintedin 4 STATE OPINIONS, supra note 58; Wis. State Bar, Ethics Op. E65-2 (1979), reprinted in WIS. B. BULL. 45 (Supp. June 1979).
289. See Pub. L. No. 89-332, 79 Stat. 1281 (1965); I.R.C. § 7452 (West 1967); 31 C.F.R.
OPINIONS,
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lar, it does not encompass the practice of state tax law. Yet, accounting
firms routinely advise clients not only about federal tax law, but also
state tax law. 290 Unless specific exception is made for accountants to
practice state tax law by each state involved-and it is not 29 1-then the
accounting firms do not have even the federal preemption argument to
justify their offering of state law advice to the public.
In short, the widespread use of in-house lawyers by accounting firms
to provide legal services to the public constitutes a flagrant disregard for
the prohibitions on lawyer-nonlawyer collaboration. It cannot be reconciled doctrinally with the rules as declared by the state courts and state
bar ethics committees. Yet, there have been few, if any, attempts to enforce the prohibitions against either the accounting profession or the law-

yers employed by it.292
There are several possible explanations for nonenforcement in this
area. First, there may be good policy reasons for not enforcing the
prohibitions against a profession that, in effect, has been given a limited
federal license to engage in the practice of law. As discussed earlier, one
traditional justification foi the prohibition is that nonlawyers might in293
terfere with lawyers in the exercise of their professional judgment.
This argument is particularly difficult to maintain since accountants are
authorized to practice federal tax law. To the extent they are authorized
to practice by themselves, they owe the same duties of professional care
to their clients as do lawyers. Any "interference" that accountants might
then offer to lawyers working with them would be more akin to the interaction between lawyers all working in the same law office.
Second, the bar associations aggressively attempted to exclude the
accounting profession from the business of offering tax advice in the
1940s and 1950s, only to lose that battle as a matter of federal preemp§§ 10.3, 10.4 (1987). The treasury regulations are careful to point out that "[n]othing in the
regulations in this part shall be construed as authorizing persons not members of the bar to
practice law." 31 C.F.R. § 10.32 (1987). Presumably this means only to disclaim any intent to
authorize activities other than practice before the IRS. See Bittker, Does Tax Practiceby Accountants Constitute the UnauthorizedPracticeof Law?, 25 J. TAX 184, 185 (1966).
290.

Bancroft v. Indemnity Insur. Co., 203 F. Supp. 49, 56 (W.D. La. 1962); M. STEVENS,

supra note 282, at 149-50 (Arthur Young, like its competitors, offers a wide range of services
including "[a]ssistance in state taxation, including representation of clients before state tax
authorities.")
291. See, eg., Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 813-20, 273 P.2d 619, 623-27
(1954); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Bailey, 409 S.W.2d 530, 530-311 (Ky. 1966); Lowell Bar
Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 187, 52 N.E.2d 27, 33 (1943).
292. The research for this Article uncovered no unauthorized practice or lawyer disciplinary action arising out of such practice during the last 20 years.
293. See supra section II(B)(1).
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tion in the federal tax area. 294 One would suppose that the bar's incentive for policing the prohibitions on nonlawyer marketing of legal
services in association with lawyers was reduced drastically once
nonlawyers were entitled to proceed without the assistance of lawyers at
all. In effect, the burden was shifted to the legal profession to demonstrate its value to the accounting profession, rather than the reverse. That
burden could not be carried very effectively if the bar were to continue to
insist on strict compliance with its traditional prohibitions on lawyer collaboration with nonlawyers because accountants might have settled for
doing without lawyers altogether.
Finally, and probably most importantly, lawyers practicing with accountants provide precisely the kind of multidisciplinary services that
should be available. There is clearly a consumer demand for such services in the tax area. The accounting firms that are able to offer the services of both lawyers and accountants probably have a competitive edge.
Significantly, one does not find any evidence that lawyers working in
such an environment have had their professional judgment or independence compromised by their nonlawyer employers and partners. Nor
does one find any complaints that client confidences are being disclosed
without consent. If such complaints were forthcoming, one can be sure
that some restrictive action would have been taken by the bar.
Whatever the reasons that may have existed for not enforcing the
traditional prohibitions in this area, the fact remains that no effort has
been made to carve out a legal exception to those prohibitions for the
accounting profession. On the contrary, many bar ethics opinions continue to indicate that the prohibitions apply fully to partnerships between
lawyers and nonlawyer accountants.2 95 Yet, the provision of such legal
services by accounting firms continues, providing a classic example of a
case when official action does not match the declared rules. The defensibility of the rules themselves is weakened to that extent.
(2) Prepaid Group Legal Services

Another area of extensive nonlawyer involvement in the business of
law is prepaid group legal services. Recently, it was estimated that about
seventeen million Americans now are covered by some sort of prepaid
294. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), there
were a number of state cases finding that accountants offering tax advice were engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. See Bittker, supra note 289, at 184-85. At least one of these
involved collaboration between a lawyer and nonlawyers. Lowell Bar Ass'n, 315 Mass. at 180,
52 N.E.2d at 30.
295. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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legal service plan. 296 This has become possible largely as a result of the
Supreme Court's decisions upholding the right of nonprofit groups, such
as unions and political organizations, to provide legal services to their
members. 297 Consequently, most of the plans are operated by or on be298
half of these organizations.
The developments in the area of for-profit plans are even more significant. Typically the participants in such plans pay a small monthly
premium in return for the provider's guarantee of certain minimum legal
services from a lawyer who has contracted with the plan providers.29 9 In
the last several years, a number of for-profit plans have been initiated,
and they are being marketed widely throughout the country.3°° Montgomery Ward, for example, offers 3 separate legal services plans that now
cover 500,000 persons in 41 states. 30 1 Prepaid Legal Services Inc., a publicly traded company based in Oklahoma, covers about 150,000 persons
in 22 states.3 0 2 Amway Corporation also is marketing plans, as are a
30 3
number of insurance companies.
Although there are no special ethical restrictions on such plans
when marketed exclusively by lawyers, there is continuing uncertainty
under the lawyer codes and the unauthorized practice rules as to the
permissibility of for-profit prepaid legal services plans marketed by
nonlawyers. 304 The discussion in section I suggests that such marketing
schemes ordinarily would be struck down as violative of those rules
prohibiting collaboration between lawyers and nonlawyers. 30 5 The rules
continue to prohibit nonlawyer financial interests in the provision of legal
services. 30 6 They continue to prohibit fee-splitting between lawyers and
nonlawyers. 30 7 In those jurisdictions in which the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility is still in force, the rules pertaining to for-profit pre296. Lewin, Legal Advice: $6. 75 a Month, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1987, at DI, col. 3.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
298. Lewin, supra note 296, at D1, col. 5.
299. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-355 (1987),
reprintedin LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 45, § 901:111 (Supp. Jan. 20, 1987).
300. Lewin, supra note 296, at D8, col. 4.
301. Telephone interview with Anthony Clark, who is in charge of regulatory compliance
for Montgomery Ward legal services plans (Nov. 17, 1987).
302. Lewin, supra note 296, at Dl, col. 3.
303. Billings, supra note 176, at 145; Lewin, supra note 296, at D1, col. 3.
304. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 14, at 478; Billings, supra note .176, at 152-59.
305. See Florida Bar v. Consolidated Business & Legal Forms, Inc., 386 So. 2d 797, 799
(Fla. 1980); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Gold Shield, Inc., 52 Ohio Misc. 105, 112-13, 369
N.E.2d 1232, 1237 (C.P Cuyahoga County 1975); see supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
306. MODEL RULES, supra note 101, Rules 5.4(b), (d).
307. Id. Rule 5.4(a).
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paid legal plans are so intricate that they almost defy understanding.30 8
They appear to prohibit a nonlawyer entrepreneur either from making a
profit from the lawyer's services or, if the nonlawyer is to make profit,
from employing, directing, supervising, or selecting the lawyer. 30 9 The
Model Rules have no special rule pertaining to such prepaid plans, so we
are required to fall back on the general prohibitions on lay involvement
with lawyers, the prohibitions on fee-splitting, and the prohibition
against a lawyer's giving someone something of value to recommend his
services. 310 Despite these various prohibitions, the marketing schemes
are multiplying at an unprecedented rate.
In part, the explanation for this phenomenon lies in the fact that
state insurance departments seem to have seized the initiative in this
area, leaving bar associations and even the courts with prepaid legal ser-

vice plans as a fait accompli.3 11 The most recent published count indicates that at least eleven states have insurance statutes that enable
entrepreneurs to establish and market for-profit legal expense plans, and
another twelve have insurance statutes allowing life insurance companies
to market legal expense insurance. 3 12 Many of the state courts apparently require annual reports to be filed for such plans. 3 13 These reporting
requirements, however, give the courts no direct regulatory authority
over those marketing the plans. 3 14 Moreover, as of 1981, only five states
required their state bars to approve plans before they could operate, and
even that approval authority was far from complete. 3 15 In the absence of
express authority from the state court or legislature, state bars risk ,antitrust liability if they attempt to regulate in this area. Consequently, a
state bar is quite likely to defer to the relevant state insurance commissioner unless and until an ethics complaint is lodged against a participat3 16
ing attorney.
308. As Lon Fuller noted in THE MORALITY OF LAW, the clarity of law is "'one of the
most essential ingredients of legality." L. FULLER, supra note 271, at 63. The bar's intricate
tinkering with the rules on prepaid legal plans thus may have "failed to make law" through
lack of clarity as well.
309. MODEL CODE, supra note 68, DR 2-103 (D)(4)(a).
310. MODEL RULES, supra note 101, Rules 5.4, 7.2(c).
311. There is a threshold question whether prepaid legal plans constitute insurance. R.
BILLINGS, supra note 264, at 404-05. But a number of jurisdictions have concluded that they
do constitute insurance. Id.
312. Id. at 101 (Supp. 1987).
313. Id. at 432.
314. Id.
315. Id. Since that time, at least Nevada has instituted a rule requiring the state Supreme
Court to certify prepaid legal service plans. NEV. SUP. CT. R. 42.5.
316. In 1988, the Washington State Bar Association released an informational bulletin in
response to consumer questions about a prepaid legal services plan called "Legal Advantage"
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Several authorities and commentators suggest that when for-profit
prepaid legal service plans are reviewed closely under the existing lawyer
ethics rules, they should be found permissible. Significantly, the ABA
has concluded that lawyer participation in such plans does not violate the
Model Rules.3 17 For example, a recent opinion of the Nevada Supreme
Court concluded that such a plan was not violative of the rule prohibiting such a marketing organization from "deriv[ing] a profit or commercial benefit from the rendition of legal services by the lawyer" because it
was merely
mak[ing] a profit from the sales of prepaid legal service agreements.
Petitioner has no direct interest in the amount of legal services provided by attorneys under their agreement with petitioner. Petitioner
and its sales associates receive a portion of the monthly "premium"
paid by plan participants, but they receive no commercial benefit from
the actual rendition of legal3 18
services in a given case (other than the
"goodwill" thus generated).
Other commentators concur that nonlawyers marketing legal service
plans are not splitting fees impermissibly with the lawyers by receiving
premium payments. They take the position that the portion of customer
premiums retained by the entrepreneur pays for administrative, marketing, and other services provided by the entrepreneur, rather than for
3 19
legal services.
being marketed in that state by the law firm of Jacoby & Myers to account holders of The Bon
Marche department store. The bulletin disclaimed information as to what specific Washington
attorneys were participating in the plan, disclaimed the authority to obtain that information
from Jacoby & Myers, a non-Washington law firm, and referred readers to the state Attorney
General's Office and the Insurance Commissioner's Office, "which may have jurisdiction over
this conduct." Printed Statement by Washington State Bar (1988) (on file at The Hastings Law
Journal).
317. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-355 (1987),
reprinted in LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 45, 901:111, 901:115 (Supp. Jan. 20, 1987).
According to the ABA, "[t]he lawyer gives nothing of value to the plan sponsor other
than the lawyer's agreement to provide legal services to subscribers in accordance with the
plan provisions. Under these circumstances, the plan sponsor is compensating the lawyer; the
lawyer is not compensating the plan." Id. at 901:114. Moreover, even if "the plan sponsor
retains a portion of the subscriber's payment in excess of administrative costs of the plan to
provide a profit for the plan sponsor," Id. at 901:115, the ABA's analysis of the history and
rationale of Model Rule 5.4 indicated that this should not constitute impermissible fee-splitting
with the lawyer. Id. In fairness, the ABA did not deny that such arrangements would constitute fee-splitting as commonly understood, but concluded instead, that it was not impermissible based on the history and rationale of the fee-splitting rule. Id. at 901:111.
318. In re Application of Am. Prepaid Legal Serv., Inc., No. 17132, slip op. at 13 (Nev.
Feb. 6, 1987). The plan was, however, found violative of other lawyer ethical rules. The court
declined to approve the plan, but indicated amendments in the lawyer/plan contracts that
might remedy the defects. Id. at 23-25.
319. Martin, EthicalGuidelinesfor Legal Service Plans,CAL. LAW., Dec. 1985, at 19, 20-
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This reasoning, while technically attractive, interprets the rules so
narrowly as to rob them of their intended meaning. To suggest, as did
the Nevada Supreme Court, that entrepreneurs are not profiting or receiving economic benefit from the provision of legal services by plan attorneys, but merely from the sale of legal service agreements, ignores the
substance of the agreement, which is to provide legal services. The entrepreneur stands to profit by the sale of these agreements only to the extent
that consumers find the legal services valuable. If the entrepreneur
charges a premium and guarantees the customer certain "free" or "reduced cost" legal services in return for that premium, it simply means
that the customer is paying for legal services, in whole or in part, with
the premium. If lawyers agree to provide certain minimum services to the
plan customers without sharing in the premium and without other direct
monetary compensation, in return for their services being promoted by
the entrepreneur, then it is the nonlawyer who is being compensated for
the lawyer's services rather than the lawyer. This amounts to fee-splitting with nonlawyers in substance, if not in form. It also constitutes giving something of value (the lawyer's services) to another in return for
320
that person recommending those services.

The fact that these plans now are being operated as for-profit businesses is evidence that there is both a public need and a public demand
for low cost legal protection. It is a charade to suggest, however, that
they do not violate the letter of one or more of the existing rules restricting nonlawyer involvement in the business of law. Thus, the existence,
and growing acceptance, of these plans illustrates once more that the
rules prohibiting nonlawyer involvement in the business of law are not
being enforced, and this serves as a further indictment of the rules'
validity.
21; Telephone interview with Anthony Clark, in charge of regulatory compliance for Montgomery Ward legal services plans (Nov. 17, 1987).
320. On the matter of a lawyer giving something of value for a recommendation, there is a
difference between the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Model Rule 7.2(c) flatly prohibits the practice except for "the usual
charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service organization." MODEL
RULES, supra note 101, Rule 7.2(c) (emphasis added). Model Code Disciplinary Rule 2103(B) also prohibits the practice, but contains an exception for "the usual and reasonable fees
or dues charged by any of the organizations listed in DR 2-103(D)." MODEL CODE, supra
note 68, DR 2-103. Even assuming that a contribution of free legal service to such an organization is within the meaning of "the usual and reasonable fees or dues," we have seen that the
permission of for-profit plans in DR 2-103(D) is so restrictive as to be almost nonexistent.
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E. Summary
There are sound reasons for allowing nonlawyer participation in the
business of law. Law is so interwoven with other professional disciplines
that it defies common sense to severely restrict their cooperation. This
cooperation, which has developed as a matter of necessity between lawyers and nonlawyers in connection with individual representation, should
be allowed on an institutional, or organizational level as well. Indeed, as
the developments in the accounting profession and in prepaid legal plans
demonstrate, institutional cooperation has developed in basic disregard
of the existing lawyer prohibitions. Nonetheless, so long as the rules are
in force, they chill other members of the various professions from pursuing their interest in such cooperation.
IV.
A.

The Road to Reform

Kutak Commission's Proposed Rule 5.4

The existing prohibitions on nonlawyer involvement in the business
of law should be discarded and replaced with a more rational approach
to nonlawyer-lawyer business cooperation. Most of the potential dangers
of such business cooperation are already the subject of ethical rules that
apply to all lawyers, regardless of the business format in which they practice.3 21 But it would be understandable, given the history of resistance to
reform in this area, if courts were to conclude that the potential dangers
were serious enough to justify a special rule dealing with these business
arrangements. A special rule would have the virtue of providing specific
notice of the requirements imposed on lawyers going into business with
nonlawyers. The Kutak Commission's proposed Rule 5.4 is an appropriate starting point. 322 The Commission's careful consideration of an appropriate substitute for the business canons found in the prior codes is
entitled to more respect than it has received.
Proposed Rule 5.4, however, should be supplemented in at least two
important respects. First, the rule explicitly should require the lawyer to
obtain contractual commitments from the nonlawyer and the organization to comply with the duties imposed on the lawyer by the lawyers'
ethics code. Ethical Consideration 5-24 of the 1969 Model Code recommended such written agreements whenever a lawyer is employed by a
nonlawyer organization. 32 3 This requirement would go a long way to321.
322.
323.

See section II(B).
See supra note 104.
94 REPoRTS OF THE A.B.A. 766 (1969); see supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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wards meeting the concern that the nonlawyer is not susceptible to the
bar's jurisdiction.
Second, the rule should require a standard disclosure to clients, advising them of the respective roles of the various professional and financial interests represented in the firm. Such a disclosure requirement
would help to prevent a client from inadvertently being misled about
which of the professionals in the firm were entitled to provide legal services, and which were entitled to provide other kinds of services. It also
would alert the client to the potential conflict that the firm might have,
for example, in handling other business for the client.
There may be other amendments that should be made to the Kutak
Commission's proposed Rule 5.4, to provide further safeguards against
the perceived dangers. It is important, however, that the rule not become
so complicated and burdensome in practice as to make nonlawyer involvement with lawyers effectively impossible, while pretending to authorize it in principle.
B. The Potential for Reform by State Courts
The most direct route for reforming the existing prohibitions on
nonlawyer involvement in the business of law would be through the highest courts of each state. State supreme courts generally have assumed the
responsibility for regulating the practice of law within their jurisdiction.
As part of the exercise of that responsibility, state courts have adopted
and changed the lawyer codes of conduct. They also have been the
courts of last appeal on most matters of attorney discipline under those
codes. Finally, they have the job of adjudicating any claims brought
under unauthorized practice legislation.
Unfortunately, the state courts have declined to modify the business
canons over the years. Since the ABA promulgated its new Model Rules,
which rejected the Kutak Commission's proposed Rule 5.4, only two jurisdictions, North Dakota and the District of Columbia, have considered
adopting the Kutak proposal instead of the ABA Model Rule. The
North Dakota Supreme Court declined to depart from the ABA Model
Rule. 324 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has not yet taken
final action on the rule proposed to it, which would allow nonlawyer
partners or managers only if (1) the firm's "sole purpose" is the practice
of law, and (2) the nonlawyer actually performs professional services in
the firm. 32 5 This rule is substantially more limited than the Kutak pro324. LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 45, at 202.
325. Rule 5.4(b), as currently proposed in the District of Columbia, would provide:
A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in which a
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posal and clearly precludes the multidisciplinary firm, and the use of
nonlawyers to obtain equity capital.
Presumably, courts that have adopted the new ABA rules have been
persuaded by the traditional justifications given for the business canons,
although the desire to conform to a single ABA model code must have
played a significant role. In those jurisdictions that have not yet adopted
the ABA's new Model Rules, 326 the case against the old business canons
should be made forcefully by interested parties during the period allowed
for comments. Perhaps some of the states that have taken their time in
acting on the new rules will be more receptive to the arguments for reform. But if the state activity over the last five years is any indication of
what we can expect, the state court rulemaking process does not promise
to be a very fruitful avenue for reform.
C. The Potential for Reform by State Legislatures
State legislatures are another place in which reform in this area logically might be expected to take place. Unlike the courts, which seem to
depend very heavily, if not exclusively, upon the organized bar for recommendations of reform, state legislatures are responsive to a much
wider set of interests. In the nineteenth century, legislative bodies were
quite active in protecting the rights of nonlawyers to engage in some
kinds of law practice.3 2 7 Then, beginning at the end of the last century
and continuing to the present, unauthorized practice legislation was
adopted in most states at the prompting of the legal profession. Nevertheless, a number of state legislatures have continued to reflect the dissatisfaction of the wider population with some of these unauthorized
financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs professionalservices which assist the organization in providing
legal services to clients, but only if:
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal services to clients;
(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a financial interest
undertake to abide by these rules of professional conduct;
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the
partnership or organization undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1;
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.
D.C. ProposedRules, supra note 117, at 44 (emphasis added).
326. The most recent published count suggests that 18 states plus the District of Columbia
still have not adopted new legal ethics rules since the ABA approved its new model rules in
1983. 1 LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 45, § 01:3-01:4 (Supp. Dec. 21, 1988).
327. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 824-25.
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practice rules by enacting statutes that have sought to permit nonlawyers
328
to engage in certain limited kinds of law practice.
The difficulty with any new statutory initiative in this area is that
such legislation undoubtedly would conflict with the business canons that
have been adopted universally by the state courts. While there would be
no theoretical impediment to legislative action had the courts not been
active in the area, the fact is that they have been active, and they are
likely to be jealous of their territory. The ultimate question for the courts
would be whether they should defer to the legislatures on matters regulating the entrepreneurial aspects of law practice even when such legislative activity is inconsistent with judicial rules. Such deference necessarily
would require a much more restrictive view of the court's inherent power
than seems typical in most American states. 329 Many state courts have
asserted that their inherent power to regulate the practice of law is of
state constitutional stature, and is exclusive, enabling them to hold inconsistent legislative actions unconstitutional. 330 Even courts that seem
willing to share power with the legislature have suggested that a direct
331
confrontation may not be tolerated.
The prospect of a stalemate between the legislative and judicial
branches of state government, if the legislatures were to attempt to abrogate the effect of the business canons, is a very real one. Legislators facing this prospect are not likely to take such initiative unless they have
some confidence that they could break the stalemate. Since the stalemate
arises because the state courts locate their power to regulate the practice
of law in the state constitutions, it can only be broken by an appeal to the
328. See, e.g., Arizona State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d
1 (1961) (title company allowed to draft documents on property it handles); Florida Bar v.
Moses, 380 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1980) (lay representation for unfair labor proceedings before hearing officer); Idaho State Bar Ass'n v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 102 Idaho 672, 637 P.2d 1168
(1981) (nonprofit organizations, utilities, and motor carriers with gross income less than
$100,000 may be represented by officers and other duly appointed representatives); Bennion,
Van Camp, Hagen & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 443, 635 P.2d 730 (1981)
(striking down statute allowing lay persons involved in real estate transaction to select, prepare, and complete documents affecting their legal rights).
329. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 27. But see, e.g., State Bar v. Galloway, 124 Mich.
App. 271, 281, 335 N.W.2d 475, 480 (1983) (inherent judicial power does not extend to authority over law practice in proceedings before Employment Security Commission). See generally Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practiceof Law-A Proposed
Delineation, 60 MINN. L. REV. 783, 799-803 (1976) (discussing relationship between judiciary
and legislature in regulating the legal profession).
330. See, e.g., Bennion, 96 Wash. 2d at 452-53, 635 P.2d at 735-36.
331. Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic, 190 Conn. 510, 527, 461 A.2d 938, 946 (1983)
(reserving the question whether some legislation might conflict with the court's power to regulate the practice of law in such a way as to be unconstitutional).
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general population to amend the state constitution to limit judicial
power. 332 For this reason it is unlikely that reform will come from the
legislatures.
D. The Potential for Reform by the Federal Government
(1) Preemption of State Court Rules by the FederalGovernment
As a potential agent for reform, the federal government has the benefit of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. 333 In the
exercise of its constitutional power, Congress is entitled to enact legislation that is inconsistent with and displaces state legislation and state
court rules. Thus, in Sperry v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that
Florida could not deny to nonlawyers the right to engage in patent practice when such a right had been conferred by federal Patent Office regula3 34
tions enacted under express legislative authority.
Federal preemption of state legislation requires the exercise of a legislative power that has been delegated to the federal government by the
Constitution. 335 In Sperry, for example, the constitutional power to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" was being exercised. 336 If Congress were to enact legislation to authorize nonlawyers to
hold financial and managerial interests in law firms, its actions would be
authorized by the federal power over interstate commerce. 337 In particular, this power provides federal control over monopolies and restraints of
338
trade through antitrust laws.
As previously discussed, however, state court rules escape antitrust
prosecution by virtue of the state action exemption. Nonetheless, since
the state action exemption is rooted in the Court's interpretation of the
congressional intent behind the Sherman Act, Congress could, if it chose,
expressly authorize nonlawyer collaboration with lawyers in the business
332. In Arizona State Bar, 90 Ariz. at 94-95, 366 P.2d at 14-15, the Arizona Supreme
Court held that title companies and real estate brokers were not entitled to prepare the legal
documents necessary for real estate transactions, and it further held that the legislature was
powerless to infringe on the court's right to determine who might practice law. The decision
was overruled by a state constitutional amendment that passed by a four to one margin. C.
WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 842.
333. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
334. 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963).
335. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 121 (2d ed. 1983).
336. Sperry, 373 U.S. at 401; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
337. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: "Congress shall have power ... To regulate commerce
... among the several states."
338. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1932).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

of law and preempt inconsistent state action.3 39 But Congress would
need to declare its intent to do so unmistakably. So far, it has shown no
interest in taking an initiative in this area. Indeed, as explained below,
congressional legislative activity has tended in the opposite direction.
By contrast, the Federal Trade Commission has for a number of
years actively sought to eliminate restrictions on nonlawyer business involvement in the practice of law. 34 ° Consequently, one would suppose

that the greatest hope for reform by the federal government in this area
lies with that agency. There are two ways in which the FTC might proceed. First, it might use its antitrust enforcement power to issue a cease
and desist order against state bar disciplinary agencies to enjoin them
from enforcing the business canons. 34 1 Second, it might use its rulemaking power to promulgate rules prohibiting enforcement of the state busi342
ness canons.
The FTC's exercise of its enforcement power, however, is likely to
run into the same difficulty that a private antitrust action might: the
state action exemption. 343 Yet, the traditional rationale for exempting
339. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 598 (1976); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 350-51 (1943).
340. The FTC actively has lobbied the various state courts considering the new model
rules in an attempt to persuade them not to adopt the restrictions on nonlawyer involvement.
See supra text accompanying note 228. It also has successfully litigated a cease and desist
order against the American Medical Association that involved comparable restrictions on
nondoctor ownership interests in medical service organizations. American Medical Ass'n v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 638 F.2d 443, 450 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd by equally divided court, 455
U.S. 676 (1982).
341. The FTC's enforcement power is set out in § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1987).
342. The FTC has authority to promulgate substantive trade regulation rules proscribing
"unfair methods of competition," National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C.Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974), and "rules which
define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(b) (1982).
343. See generally Clarkson & Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and Occupational
Regulation, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION 107 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1980)
(uncertain whether the FTC can preempt anticompetitive state law); Young & Troy, Federal
Trade Commission Preemption of State Regulation: A Reevaluation, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
1248, 1263-65 (1978) ("The absence of case law and a clear congressional intent to preempt
regulation requires an inquiry into whether any national policy is discernible to govern the
issue of FTC preemption of state action."); Note, The State Action Exemption and Antitrust
Enforcement Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 89 HARV. L. REV. 715, 719 (1976)
(Congress did not consider specifically whether the FTC Act should apply to state action); cf
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT: PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICE DISCLOSURES

§ VI(C) (1975) [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT].
Significantly, legislation was proposed in 1982 and again in 1983 that would have applied
expressly the state action exemption doctrine to the FTC, but apparently none of it was able to
command sufficient support even to reach the floor of either house. S. 1714, 98th Cong., 1st
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state action from antitrust enforcement actions does not apply as forcefully when the enforcer is a federal agency with public investigative capability, special expertise in the antitrust area, and the ability to weigh the
state's interest before choosing to proceed against anticompetitive practices. 344 Nonetheless, the FTC apparently has proceeded for some time
on the assumption that the state action doctrine does limit its authority
345
to prosecute persons it believes are engaged in unfair trade practices.
Unless and until the FTC changes its view of the law on this score, it is

not likely to initiate reform through this means.
On the other hand, the FTC has taken the position that its rulemaking authority is not limited by the state action exemption. Accordingly,

it has asserted the authority to preempt inconsistent state laws, including
those designed to regulate licensed professionals. 34 6 This position is supported by the federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
347
American FinancialServices Association v. Federal Trade Commission:

"[W]hile Congress did not intend the Commission's regulations to 'occupy the field,' it did intend FTC rules to have that preemptive effect
which flows naturally from a repugnancy between the Commission's
valid enactments and state laws. '348 While Congress could limit the
Sess. § 2(a) (1983); H.R. 2970, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1983); see S. REP. No. 215, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. 10, 26 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 156, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 20 (1983). For the
views of one FTC commissioner on the various proposals, see Calvani, An FTC Commissioner's View of Regulating Lawyers, 70 A.B.A. J. 70 (Aug. 1984).
344. Verkuil, Preemption of State Law by the FederalTrade Commission, 1976 DUKE L.J.
225, 231; Note, supranote 343, at 731-37; see also 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 210,
at 115-18 (arguing that congressional willingness to preempt state law through the FTC is
inferred due to the special characteristics of the FTC).
345. Massachusetts Furniture & Piano Movers Ass'n, 102 F.T.C. 1176, 1214-21 (1983);
FTCAuthorization: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. for the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 27 (1985) (remarks by James
C. Miller III, Chairman, FTC); Reauthorization of the FTC: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1982) (remarks by
James C. Miller III, Chairman, FTC) [hereinafter 1982 Hearings]; FTCActivities Concerning
Professionals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1981) (remarks by David A.
Clanton, Acting Chairman, FTC) [hereinafter 1981 Hearings]; Clanton, The FTC and the Pro'fessions, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 209, 212 n.12 (1983).
346. 1981 Hearings, supra note 345, at 17-18; FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 343,
§ VI(B), (C). As commentators havepointed out aptly, the state action exemption doctrine is
simply a branch of preemption law. P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 83-86 (Supp. 1987).
347. 767 F.2d 957, 989-90 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986). Several
commentators have argued, however, that the federalism interests in this area should require a
much clearer statement of congressional intent than is presently in the Federal Trade Commission Act before the FTC is held to be entitled to preempt economic regulation by the states. P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 210, at 118; Young & Troy, supra note 343, at 1266-68.
348. American Fin. Servs., 767 F.2d at 989-90.
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FTC's authority to regulate licensed professionals, attempts to do so have
not been successful. 349 Thus, the FTC might attempt to preempt inconsistent state court and legislative rules that bar nonlawyer participation
in the business of law through the use of its rulemaking authority.
Such an initiative by the Commission would be bound to provoke
criticism from the organized bar and the individual states, jealous to preserve their respective interests. At issue are important federalism concerns. The federal government should not act lightly to displace wellentrenched state laws, especially in those areas that the states have "a
compelling interest" in regulating. 350 It follows even more forcefully
that a federal agency, acting under a general grant of rulemaking author-

351
ity, ought to be very cautious in exercising its preemptive authority.
Nevertheless, the FTC is well situated to institute reform in this
area. Unlike state courts and bar associations, the FTC has special expertise in the antitrust area and has the power to investigate the economic effects of the existing rules. If it concludes that reform is
necessary, it can initiate a rulemaking proceeding. The strength of the
rulemaking process is that it provides a full opportunity for state interests
to be heard and considered by the FTC. 35 2 Moreover, any Commission
action would need to be supported by substantial evidence in the
rulemaking record. 353 This standard of review would give the courts ample opportunity to ensure that state interests were considered fully and
weighed before an FTC rule would be found to have preempted the state
rule. 354 With these protections in mind, the Commission should take the
initiative and attempt to dislodge the states from their attachment to the
business canons.
349. Verkuil, supra note 344, at 225-27. Legislation was introduced in 1982 and 1983 that
would have exempted, to varying degrees, state-regulated professionals from FTC jurisdiction,
including FTC rulemaking authority. Senate Bill 2499, for example, would have removed
FTC authority "to prescribe any rule with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.. . regulating the activity of any practitioners of a profession whose members are licensed and regulated by a State as a condition of independent practice within a
State." S. 2499, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1982); see also 1982 Hearings, supra note 345, at 1921, 32-35; 1981 Hearings, supra note 345, at 15-18, 22-27. These legislative initiatives were
unsuccessful and the FTC's authority to preempt inconsistent state law has since been affirmed. American Fin. Servs., 767 F.2d at 989.
350. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792-93 (1975).
351. Verkuil, supra note 344, at 243-47.
352. Note, supra note 343, at 745-48.
353. American Fin. Servs., 767 F.2d at 985-88; 15 U.S.C. 57a(e)(3)(A) (1982).
354. Note, supra note 343, at 749-51.
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(2) Litigation Against the ABA
One alternative to preemptive federal legislation or rules would be
an antitrust suit against the ABA for its promotion of anticompetitive
business restrictions. There are a number of advantages to this course of
action. First, because the ABA is a voluntary association with no governmental status, it cannot claim the protection of the state action defense. Second, even though individual state courts and legislatures would
retain the protection of the state action defense and could continue to
adopt anticompetitive business restrictions, eliminating the ABA's influence in this area through a successful antitrust suit would be a potent
stimulus to reform at the state level.
Nonetheless, there are several obstacles in an antitrust suit brought
against the ABA. One issue would be whether the ABA's activities in
adopting, distributing, recommending, and interpreting the Model Rules
would be sufficient to constitute a violation of the Sherman Act or the
Federal Trade Commission Act. This was also an issue in a 1976 suit
against the ABA alleging that the activities of the ABA restricting lawyer advertising violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 3 55 An important
aspect of the Justice Department's lawsuit was its allegation that the
ABA actively policed its 1969 Code. 356 The ABA publicly denied this
allegation, noting that "the Association has no power to restrain advertising. It merely promulgates a model code of professional conduct for
'357
consideration by the state bodies regulating the practice of law."
Moreover, in response to this lawsuit, the ABA took a number of steps to
lessen the restrictive effect of its activities in addition to its specific
change of the advertising rules. It eliminated the requirement that members abide by the ABA ethics code. 358 It also made clear that its code
was purely a model, and was not intended to bind any individual lawyer. 359 The Justice Department concluded that these changes, together
355. United States v. American Bar Ass'n (D.D.C. June 25, 1976), complaint reprintedin
62 A.B.A. J.979, 980 (Aug. 1976). The Justice Department's complaint against the ABA
largely was rendered moot by the Supreme Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350 (1977), that the restrictions on lawyer advertising violated the first amendment.
356. The government intended to introduce evidence concerning the adoption of the restrictive code provisions and the ABA activities that enhanced and reinforced them, including:
(1) the requirement that ABA members abide by the provisions; (2) the operation of a program
of surveillance and review to ensure that lawyers' conduct conformed to the ABA Code; (3)
the issuance of interpretive opinions at the request of members or local bar officials; and (4) the
advocacy of the widest possible adoption of restrictive advertising rules by state regulatory
agencies. Justice Dep't, supra note 216, at 1540.
357. PressStatement of President Walsh, 62 A.B.A. J. 981, 981 (Aug. 1976).
358. Justice Dep't, supra note 216, at 1540.
359. Id.
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with repeal of the rules banning advertising, "substantially eliminated the
A.B.A.'s policing efforts."' 360 Since the Justice Department dismissed
this suit, the ABA has taken other action to protect itself from antitrust
exposure. It has rescinded many of its "statements of principles," which
purported to delineate what nonlawyers could and could not do in lawrelated areas. 36 1 It also has discontinued the publication of The Unauthorized Practice News362 and terminated its Committee on the Unau363
thorized Practice of Law.
These changes would be relevant in any allegation that the ABA
continues to enforce its business canons. The activities that the ABA has
continued to perform, however, in adopting, distributing, recommending,
and interpreting the business canons might still be sufficient to constitute
a violation of the Sherman Act or the Federal Trade Commission Act.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the state ethics opinions on minimum-fee schedules threatened professional discipline for habitual disregard of the fee schedules. 364 The Court
went on to suggest, however, that enforcement activity was not necessary
to establish a violation of the antitrust laws: "Even without that threat
the opinions would have constituted substantial reason to adhere to the
schedules because attorneys could be expected to comply in order to assure that they did not discredit themselves by departing from professional norms, and perhaps betraying their professional oaths. ' 365 This
statement by the Court has led one federal court of appeals to conclude
that "even without coercive enforcement, a court may find that members
of an association promulgating guidelines sanctioning conduct in violation of § 1 participated in an agreement to engage in an illegal refusal to
deal."' 366 In the last five years, the ABA has been active in urging the
retention of the business canons by adopting, distributing, and advocating its "new" Model Rules, which retained the business restrictions without significant change. This activity may contravene section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 367 It is even more likely that it would be held to be a
360.
361.
362.

Id. at 1541.
See supra note 47.
Goldberg, Message from the Chairman, 40 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS iii

(1977).
363. 109 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 601, 700 (1984).
364. 421 U.S. 773, 791 n.21 (1975).
365. Id.
366. Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 230 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1210 (1984).
367. This suggestion is likely to be tested in the near future. On August 19, 1988, a private
antitrust action against the ABA, and other bar organizations, was filed by a public interest
group in Illinois federal court. Lawline v. American Bar Ass'n, No. 88C7203 (N.D. Ill. filed
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violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act in an action brought by
368
the FTC.
Another difficulty that might arise in any action against the ABA to
enjoin its promotion of the business canons would be the Association's
inevitable assertion that the business canons are justified by the need to
protect clients. The Supreme Court left the door open to such a justification of otherwise anticompetitive conduct by its observation in Goldfarb
that "[t]he public service aspect, and other features of the professions,
may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as
a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. ' 369 In cases subsequent to Goldfarb, however, the Court has not
been very receptive to such public safety or public health justifications for
restrictive professional rules. 370 Moreover, even if one assumes that the
bar has restricted business associations between lawyers and nonlawyers
in order to protect clients, there are much less restrictive ways of satisfying that concern than the outright ban presently contained in the
371
rules.
A final impediment to any action against the ABA, however, would
be its assertion that its activities are protected by the first amendment.
Under the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, collective action by businesses and
associations aimed at petitioning legislative bodies, administrative agencies, or courts for action that may have anticompetitive effects is protected broadly from liability under the antitrust laws by virtue of the first
amendment. 372 This doctrine is intertwined closely with the state action
exemption, because if the petitions directed towards government are successful, and government acts do adopt the anticompetitive recommendations of the petitioner, then the state becomes a supervening cause of any
Aug. 19, 1988). The suit alleges that the ABA and the other defendants have, among other
things, violated the Sherman Act by "the enforcement of a concerted refusal... to deal with
non-lawyers, paraprofessionals, and paralegals, in any capacity other than as employer/employee." IaL at para. 55.
368. The Supreme Court has made it clear that concerted conduct that falls short of being
a Sherman Act violation nevertheless may constitute an "unfair method of competition" under
the Trade Commission Act. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 708
(1948). "A major purpose of that Act... was to enable the Commission to restrain practices
as 'unfair' which, although not yet having grown into Sherman Act dimensions would most
likely do so if left unrestrained." Id.
369. 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975).
370. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463-64 (1986);
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
371. See supra section II.
372. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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competitive injury. 373 On several occasions, therefore, the doctrine has

been extended to protect the lobbying of private trade associations that
adopt industry-wide codes that depend for their efficacy on adoption by
374
state and local governments.
As already noted, the ABA now takes the position that its Model
Rules are simply recommendations for action by state governmental bodies regulating the practice of law and that its activities in connection with
the rules, therefore, are protected constitutionally. 375 In the last ten
years the ABA has curtailed most of its efforts to implement its ethics
code without the assistance of public bodies. Indeed, if the ABA's experience with adoption of the Model Rules is any indication, its influence
with state supreme courts is sufficiently pervasive that it really does not
need to resort to private self-help measures. 376 Thus, the challenge to
any antitrust plaintiff would be to show that the ABA's activities extend
beyond mere exercise of the right to petition public bodies. Certainly,
the ABA's ethics opinions interpreting its rules are addressed not just to
public officials, but to the bar as a whole. 377 An antitrust action recently
filed in Illinois against the ABA and other defendants alleges that the
ABA also has sought to restrain trade by public speeches relating to lawyer association with paralegals. 378 Whether such activities are sufficient
to constitute an antitrust violation, however, may depend on whether
they were intended to influence only lawmakers. That is a factual inquiry beyond the scope of this Article.
E. Constitutional Arguments
Even if an antitrust action against the ABA succeeded, however,
this would leave the business canons intact in jurisdictions where they
have been promulgated by state action. Barring congressional or, per373. See generally P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 346, at 10 (even if a private
party persuades the government to act, the government's decision to act, as an independent
choice, is a supervening cause).
66,989
374. Sessions Tank Lines, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
(C.D. Cal. 1986); Rush-Hampton Indus. v. Home Ventilating Inst., 419 F. Supp. 19, 25 (M.D.
Fla. 1976); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp, 573 F. Supp. 833
(N.D. Ill. 1983).
375.

PressStatement of President Walsh, 62 A.B.A. J. 981 (Aug. 1976).

376. See I LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 45, § 01:3-1:4 (Supp. Dec. 21, 1988) (indicating that as of Dec. 1988, 30 states had adopted the new Model Rules, including the business
canons).
377. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356
(1988) (interpreting applicability of Rule 5.4 to nonlawyer placement agencies supplying lawyers to law firms), digested in 4 LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 45, at 427-29 (1989).
378. Lawline v. American Bar Ass'n, No. 88C77203, at 30-32 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 19,
1988).
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haps, FTC action, such rules will remain immune under the antitrust
laws. The question naturally arises, therefore, whether there are constitutional grounds for overturning the state restrictions. As we have seen,
the Supreme Court ruled, in a series of four cases decided between 1963
and 1971, that civil rights groups and labor unions have the right to provide legal services to their members. 379 The right was based on "the freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and
38 0
Fourteenth Amendments.
Each of the groups involved in these cases was nonprofit, and each
was an organization of members united by interests independent of the
members' need for legal services. Nothing in the cases suggests, however, that the rights announced are limited to such member organizations. The Court itself, in summarizing the four cases, declared that
"[t]he common thread running through our [four] decisions.., is that
collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is
'381
a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment.
Commentary, therefore, has suggested that these decisions may support a
more general first amendment right to association that is shared by forprofit enterprises such as those discussed in this Article. 382 Such constittitional arguments seem to have been the principal justification given the
House of Delegates in defense of the Kutak proposals for reform of the
383
business canons.
When similar arguments have been asserted in support of for-profit
nonlawyer enterprises, they have been rejected summarily by state
courts. In Gold Shield, Inc., for example, the Ohio court rejected the
petitioner's reliance on the four Supreme Court legal services cases on
the ground that in those cases, the legal services activities of the organizations were "only incidental to their primary purposes and activities,"
whereas the whole purpose and existence of the petitioner was to provide
legal services and monetary profits for the corporation and its principals. 384 In ConsolidatedBusiness and Legal Forms, the Florida Supreme
Court rejected without discussion the petitioner's claim that associational
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
Dennis
384.
N.E.2d

See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-23 (1967).
United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971).
Billings, supra note 176, at 157.
See HOD Transcript, supra note 107, at 34-35, 40, 42-45 (remarks by Michael Frank,
Archer, and William McCalpin).
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Gold Shield, Inc., 52 Ohio Misc. 105, 111-12, 369
1232, 1236 (C.P Cuyahoga County 1975).
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rights arising out of the first amendment, such as were upheld in the
38 5
Supreme Court cases, were involved.
A careful reading of the Supreme Court's cases also gives little reason to suppose that the legal services cases can be read broadly enough to
encompass for-profit legal service organizations. First, in Button the
Court acknowledged the extensive case law striking down nonlawyer
legal service arrangements in which there was an element of pecuniary
gain that might interfere with rendering legal services. 31 6 While the
Court claimed to "intimate no view" on the merits of these decisions, it
did distinguish carefully the facts in Button from these cases on the
ground that "no monetary stakes are involved, and so there is no danger
that the attorney will desert or subvert the paramount interests of his
client to enrich himself or an outside sponsor.

'38 7

Only months after Button was decided, the Court was asked to
strike down as violative of due process and equal protection a Kansas
statute prohibiting the business of debt collection by nonlawyers.3 88 In
an opinion by Justice Black, who joined the majority in Button and wrote
the majority opinions in all three of its progeny, the Court emphatically
refused to consider the wisdom of the state legislation.3 8 9 It also concluded that the equal protection clause did not forbid the state from limiting debt adjusting to lawyers. 390 The state legislation was upheld and
there was no mention of the associational rights upheld in Button.
None of the Supreme Court opinions extending Button to labor unions gives any direct suggestion that the first amendment rights established there would apply to legal services organizations set up by
nonlawyers for profit. Nor do any of the Court's other decisions address
the issue. Two Supreme Court decisions in a related area, however, do
have some significance. In North Dakota Pharmacy Board v. Snyder's
Stores, the Court was asked to strike down as violative of due process a
North Dakota statute that required a majority of shares of a pharmacy
company to be owned by pharmacists. 39 1 The Court declined to do so,
refusing to engage in "substantive due process" to review the wisdom of
state legislation.3 92 In another decision, the Court affirmed without opin385.
1980).
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

Florida Bar v. Consolidated Business & Legal Forms, Inc., 386 So. 2d 797, 801 (Fla.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 441-42 (1963).
Id. at 443.
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
Id. at 731.
Id. at 732-33.
414 U.S. 156, 157 n.1 (1974).
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ion the decision of a three judge court in Garcia v. Texas State Board of
Medical Examiners.393 In Garcia, a Texas law that required at least
some of the incorporators of a Health Maintenance Organization to be
licensed to practice medicine in Texas. 394 The petitioners challenged the
statute under the Button line of cases, but the three judge court rejected
the analogy. "These cases involved the question of... whether the membership had the right to engage in association for the advancement of
legitimate beliefs and ideas. The Mine Workers case does not hold that a
' 39 5
corporation can practice law and is not applicable to the case at bar.
The Court held that the Texas legislature was entitled to enact such legislation "to preserve the vitally important doctor-patient relationship, and
prevent possible abuses resulting from lay person control of a corpora'396
tion employing licensed physicians on a salaried basis."
While neither of these decisions directly relates to arrangements between lawyers and nonlawyers, they do suggest, as Professor Wolfram
has observed, that the Button line of cases rests "more on litigational
(petition of grievances) rights than on associational freedoms. '397 The
Garciarejection of the Button line of cases, and its crediting of the same
argument that is made in support of the prohibitions on nonlawyer involvement in the business of law, are particularly relevant. Taken together with the summary rejection of the first amendment arguments in
the Gold Shield and the ConsolidatedBusiness and Legal Forms cases,
these decisions do not offer much prospect for a constitutional remedy
against the prohibitions of nonlawyer involvement in the business of law.
Conclusion
Today there is a widely recognized need and demand for innovative
arrangements between lawyers and nonlawyers that would provide multidisciplinary services to the public, and that would provide infusions of
capital to enable such organizations to serve the public better and more
efficiently. Unfortunately, rules prohibiting lay involvement in the business of law remain on the books in practically every jurisdiction in the
United States. In reviewing the origins and history of these rules, one
cannot help but conclude that they owe their surprising tenacity more to
the fact that they serve the profession's economic self-interest than to any
valid public purpose. Ordinarily such a conclusion would dictate vigor393. 421 U.S. 995 (1975), affrg mem. 384 F. Supp. 434 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
394. 384 F. Supp. at 436.
395. Id. at 440.
396. Id.
397. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 901.
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ous challenges to the rules based on the antitrust laws. These challenges
might succeed against the ABA, and even against state and local bar
associations that act without the sanction or mandate of the state. Insofar as they are aimed at state court or legislative rules, however, such
challenges are doomed to fail because of the state action immunity
doctrine.
This leaves only three serious avenues for reform. The first is the
federal government. Only the FTC or Congress is able to displace the
lawyer monopoly on any systematic basis. Federal action would have the
advantage of immediately providing a unified rule for the legal profession
that comports with the antitrust laws that apply to most other kinds of
business activity.
The second avenue for reform is the ABA. Unfortunately, the ABA
never
been a leader of reform in this area, and in 1983 the House of
has
Delegates rejected the Kutak proposal that would have permitted nonlawyer involvement in the business of law. Nevertheless, if sufficient
pressure is put upon the ABA by its membership, by the public, and,
perhaps, by the federal government, it could be persuaded to take a second look at the Kutak proposal for reform of the business canons.
Finally, reform may come from the individual states. The state
courts should reevaluate the business canons in light of the needs of contemporary society and recognize the need for change. While reform by
the state courts would not offer as quick or as unified a response to this
societal need as would federal reform or the leadership of the ABA, it
would offer the opportunity for experimentation with a variety of business rules that are less restrictive than those that have been in force for
the last sixty years.
It is only a matter of time before the business canons will be changed
to meet the needs of contemporary society. Change may come as a result
of federal preemption. It may come as a result of litigation and public
outcry against the legal monopoly. Or it may come as a result of leadership by the bench and bar. The legal profession has always had something of a tarnished reputation with the public. Perhaps if lawyers were
to take the initiative and acknowledge that they are prepared to work
with others as full partners that reputation would be improved.

